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COLORADO'S NEW DIVORCE LAW
By

EDWIN P.

VAN CISE

Edwin P. Van Cise received his A.B. degree from the University of Colorado
in 1937 and his LL.B. degree from Harvard Law School in 1940. He is a
member of the Denver firm of Van Cise and Van Cise, an associate with the
firm of Knight, Lesher and Schmidt, and a part-time instructor at the University of Denver College of Law. Since 1955 he has served as Chairman of
the Domestic Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar Association.
The 1958 General Assembly passed Senate Bill 11, and the bill be(ame law when the Governor failed either to sign or veto it. The bill
represents the combined efforts of a large number of lawyers who at one
time or another have served on the Colorado Bar Association's Domestic
Relations and Legislative Committees or who have made constructive
suggestions to them, and of many laymen who have collaborated in its
preparation.
It is not a cure-all. It does not furnish a solution to the basic problems of imperfect marriages. But it is hoped that it has eliminated some
of the problems inherent in the old law.
MWARRIAGE

COUNSELLING

Section 46-1-1 is new. It provides: "It is, and shall be, the
policy of tile State of Colorado to discourage divorce and to promote and foster the marriage relationship and reconciliation of
estranged spouses; nothing in this act shall be construed to prevent, prohibit, or inhibit domestic relations counselling services
by the courts, by agencies of government, by private agencies or
groups, or by any other qualilied source. It is further declared
to be the policy of the State of Colorado to encourage the establishment of facilities to assist in the reconciliation of estranged
spouses."
Note that there is nothing mandatory about its terms. it is merely
a statement of policy, without any positive implementation.
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE

Section 16-1-2 (Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-1-1, 1953) restates the grounds
for divorce. The discretionary language of the old law is retained in the
opening paragraph, which reads:
"Any marriage may be dissolved and divorce granted for
any one or more of the following named reasons; and for no
other cause:"
Thus it is apparent, as before, that even if the grounds are proved the
trier of the facts is still not obligated to grant a divorce.
As to specific grounds, the former grounds of impotency (at time
of marriage, or after marriage "through immoral conduct"), adultery,
wilful desertion without reasonable cause for one year, mental or physical
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cruelty, and non-support of family for one year, are in the new law without word change, as grounds (1), (2), (3) , (4), and (5), respectively.
Only slight changes appear in the old grounds of one year's habitual
drunkenness or drug addiction [new (6) ] and conviction of a felony
[new (7) 1. The words "drug fiend" in the old law were changed to
"drug addict." Conviction of a felony since the marriage was broadened
to include conviction of "a felony in a court of record in any state, territory, federal district, or United States possession since marriage."
The ground of insanity was reworded [new (8) ]. The main changes
were to reduce the period from 5 to 3 years, to eliminate the necessity
for medical testimony as to incurable insanity, and to change the wording from "adjudged insane" and proved "incurably insane" to a wording
"adjudicated an insane, mentally ill, or mentally deficient person, or a
mental incompetent." It also spells out the requirement of proof that
the spouse "has not, prior to the entry of decree of divorce, been adjudicated restored to reason or competency." The caution as to the continuing duty of the divorcing husband to support the wife remains in
the law "unless she has sufficient property or means to support herself."
The old ground of bigamy is left out of the new law for obvious
reasons. Proof of a valid marriage has always been considered a prerequisite to qualify for a divorce. The 1957 law pertaining to annulment
and determination of marital status amply covers this situation.
A new ground [new (9) ] provides:
"That the parties have lived separate and apart for a period
of three consecutive years, or more, next prior to the commencement of the action for divorce, by force of a decree of a court of
record in any state, territory, or United States possession or district."
The italicized words are the key phrase. Mere living apart is insufficient, unless it has been pursuant to a court decree.
The safeguard provision assuring legitimacy of children of divorce
and their inheritance rights is retained without change.
JURISDICTION

Section 46-1-2 deals with jurisdiction. The wording of the old law
is considerably changed, but there is little change in substance. It should
be noted, however, that the concurrent jurisdiction of the county and
superior court specifies "actions for divorce wherein the complaint shall
aver that the plaintiff does not seek alimony, child support, and division
of property, or either of them, in excess of two theusand dollars in value."
Previously it had been undecided whether the county court had jurisdiction when cumulative child support could exceed the two thousand
dollar limit. Under the new law, it lacks jurisdiction.
Former provisions relating to procedure for transferring the action
to the district court and for pleading an answer were eliminated. The
new law allows the normal procedure applicable in nther civil crtions
to apply here, stating:
"The process, practice, and proceedings shall be in accordance with the rules of civil procedure, except as expressly modified or otherwise provided in this article."
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A new paragraph has been added which applies when the adverse
party is mentally ill, etc. It specifies that in such a case "the court shall
appoint a guardian ad litem for such spouse; service shall be obtained on
such spouse, on the guardian ad litem, and on the conservator of such
spouse, if any." It then sets out as a requirement that "if any relief other
than divorce or child custody is sought, a conservator shall be a party to
the action."
REsII)IrNCE -

VENUE OF

AcTION

Section 46-1-3 should be studied carefully to avoid misunderstanding. There are three significant changes in the old law on this subject.
Formerly, the residence of the plaintiff was the controlling factor,
although this had been widened by COurt decision to allow a non-resident
defendant to secure by counterclaim a divorce from a resident plaintiff.'
The new law allows a divorce if "one spouse has been a bona fide resident
of this state during the one year next prior to the commencement of the
action."
The old law had specified that the action could be commenced only
in the county of the plaintiff's or the defendant's residence or in which
the defendant last resided. This had been determined to be jurisdictional, and divorces obtained in counties other than the ones so designated have been held void by our supreme court.2
The new law makes no mention of the county in which the action
shall be filed, and it goes further, to provide: "The venue of the action
shall be as provided by the rules of civil procedure."'
It is submitted that it was the intention in this new law to overrule
the old decisions that venue was lurisdictional in divorce actions.
A new sentence appears in the new law, providing that:
"The wife shall not be considered to have the residence
of the husband based merely on the marriage relationship."
This provision may have far-reaching implications. Its application
to service marriages is at once apparent.
DEFENSES TO DIVORCE

This is an entirely new section, supplanting old sections 4 and 8.
The only defenses to a divorce action are spelled out in Section 461-4. By its limitations, recrimination (denying a divorce when both
parties are guilty old section 4] ) is no longer a defense or a bar to a
divorce.
The other common law defenses, not previously contained in the
statute but generally recognized as available, are set forth in the new law.
These are (1) Lack of jurisdiction, (2) Failure to establish a case,
(3) Collusion (4) Condonation, (5) Connivance, and (6) Fraud on
the court. Collusion, condonation and connivance are specifically defined
in the law, but with the usual common law definitions.
The new law specifies that:
"In no event shall a party be precluded from introducing
evidence to show extenuation, provocation, mitigation, or justification concerning the acts complained of by the cther party."

1 Harms

v. Harms, 120 Colo. 209 P.2d 552 (1949).

District Court, 127 Colo. 483. 258 P.2d 483 (1953);
2 People ex rel. Plunkett v.
Hilliard v. Klein, 124 Colo. 479, 238 P.2d 882 (1951): Branch v. Branch, 30 Colo. 499,
rel.
Lackey v. District Court, 30 Colo. 123. 69 Pac. 597
71 Pac. 632 (1902); People ex
(1902).
3 See Colo. R. Civ. P. 98 (c).
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This appears to remedy the present situation where, for failure to plead
the above, on occasions the party has been barred from introducing such
evidence. On the other hand, it appears to regard such matters not as
affirmative defenses but merely as negations or minimizations of opposing evidence.
A significant new provision is in the last paragraph which shows
how completely the old theory of recrimination has been reversed. It provides that:
"If, upon the trial of an action for divorce, either or both
of the parties shall be found guilty of any one, or more, of the
grounds for divorce, then a divorce may be granted to either, or
both, of said parties in accordance with such findings."
Note that the trier of facts still has discretion-the word "may" is
included. The concept of a "guilty" party-inherent in the adversary
theory of civil actions-is retained, but much of the stigma is removed by
allowing the granting of a divorce to either or both. This same idea is
repeated in new Section 46-1-9.
ALIMONY - CUSTODY OF CHILDREN -

PROPERTY DIVISION

Decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court have done little to clarify
the law concerning alimony and property division and the time for seeking and obtaining the same.' The new law, new Section 46-1-5, it is hoped,
presents a clearer statement.
Paragraph (1) specifies that:
"At all times after the filing of the complaint, whether before or after the issuance of a divorce decree, the court may
make such orders, if any, as the circumstances of the case may
warrant for:
" (a) Custody of minor children;
" (1)) Care and support of children dependent upon the
parent or parents for support;
" (c) Alimony;
" (d) Suit money, court costs, and attorney fees; and
" (e) Any other matters (except division of property) in
controversy between the parties."
This eliminates the confusing wording in the old law providing for
"alimony and counsel fees pendente lite" and for alimony, etc. "when a
divorce has been granted." Desirable or not, the new law permits these
matters to be taken care of "whether before or after divorce." Subject
to court discretion, it appears to allow a wife or ex-wife (in the absence of
a release or waiver) to seek alimony for the first time at a date considerably later than the entry of a decree, and to assure that her attorney has
a right to fees on matters arising after the divorce. No change is made,
however, in basic law pertaining to what must be alleged in the original
complaint, or in the consequences from not having a sufficiently inclusive
prayer in the complaint. Obligation for support of "children" appears
to be extended beyond minority in the situation where such child is
"dependent ...for support."
Paragraph (2) sets the time for dividing the property-which is far
4 Vines v. Vines, 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 329 (1958) (Separate maintenance
case); Rodgers v. Rodgers, 323 P.2d 892 (1958); Gregory v. Gregory, 130 Colo. 489, 276
P.2d 750 (1954); Ikeler v. Ikeler, 84 Colo. 429, 271 Pac. 193 (1928).
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from clear in the old law. The new law specifies that it shall be done
"at the time of the issuance of a divorce decree, or at some reasonable
time thereafter as may be set by the court at the time of the issuance
of said divorce decree."
No definite formula is prescribed, the reasonable discretion of tile
court remaining the only controlling factor, in the wording "such orders,
if any, as the circumstances of the case may warrant relative to division
of property, in such proportions as may be fair and equitable."
The old law limited the right to security to orders for alimony.' The
new law, in paragraph (3) gives the court "the power to reqbire security
to be given to insure enforcement of its orders"--thus covering any and
all orders in the action.
There was previously much uncertainty, to say the least, as to the
right of a court after entry of decree to go into matters which could not
have been passed on due to lack of personal jurisdiction over tile defendant. Paragraph (4) of the new law specifies that the court "shall retain
jurisdiction of the action . . . for the purpose of hearing any matters
recited in (1) , (2) and (3) of this section which it was unable to determine at earlier hearings for lack of personal jurisdiction over one of the
parties." This is also extended to clarify its rights to reopen for other
reasons, retaining jurisdiction in the court to hear any of such matters
"which it was unable to determine ...for lack of knowledge or information, or because of fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment."
Any doubts about the rights to modify or change previous orders are
resolved in the wording that "the court shall retain jurisdiction of the
action for the purpose of such later revisions of its orders pertaining to
• . . [custody, support, alimony, suit noney, court costs, attorney tees,
other matters (except division of property) , and requirements for security] as changing circumstances may require."
Paragraph (5) repeats the old law about termination of rights to
alimony on remnarriage, but makes it apply even if the remarriage is "void
or voidable." It allows the parties to provide otherwise by "written
agreement or stipulation."
Paragraph (6) affects the old decision' which held that, on failure
to set forth verbatim in the decree the provisions of an agreement, the
divorce court lacked the power to enforce the agreement. The new law
specifies that:
"Any written agreement or stipulation by the parties as
to any of the above matters, when incorporated in an order or
decree or when filed in the action and referred to and approved
and adopted in any order or decree, shall become a part of such
order or decree."
TRIAL NINETY DAYS AFTER SERVICE - DISMiISSAL
The old law had specified that there could be no trial until 30 days
after filing the action. New Section 46-1-7 specifies:
"No trial for an action for divorce shall be had until at
least 90 days after service of process; provided, however, upon
Brown v. Brown, 131 Colo. 280, 283 P.2d 951 (1955); cf. Vines v. Vines, note 4
supra.
6 Campbell v. Goodbar. 110 Colo. 403, 134 P.2d 1060 (1943); McWilliams v. McWilliams. 110 Colo. 173, 132 P.2d 966 (1942); Hall v. Hall. 105 Colo. 227. 97 P.2d 415
(1939): Kastner v. Kastner. 90 Colo. 280, 9 P.2d 290 (1932).
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motion of either party, the court shall continue said trial for an
additional 30 days, and the court may, upon motion of either
party, or upon its own motion, grant other and. additional continuances, from time to time."
And opponents called this a Quickie Divorce Bill!
The new law also provides for dismissal with prejudice if not tried
within a year after commencement of the action. This is mandatory
("shall be dismissed") "on motion of the court or of either party, except
for good cause shown."
DECREE FINAL ON ENTRY

Old Section 46-1-9 made the decree final six months after entry of
interlocutory decree, and allowed dismissal within that period for good
cause shown. "Good cause" had been interpreted as an), reason at all, if
requested by the "innocent" party.'
New Section 46-1-9 provides for only one decree, final on entry. It
states:
"After the trial of an action for divorce, the court shall
enter a judgment or decree dismissing the action or granting a
final decree of divorce to either or both parties."
SECTIONS RETAINED UNCHANGED

Old Section 46-1-11 (appeals as in other civil cases) and Section
46-1-15 (indigent women may sue without payment of costs) are unchanged.'
SECTIONS REPEALED

Former Section 46-1-6 (jury trial may be waived) comes out as unnecessary. R.C.P. applies as in other civil actions. Note, jury trial requests are probably now required within the standard 10 day rate.
Old Section 46-1-8 (dismissal in event of collusion) is repealed. The
gist is included in new Section 46-1-4 on defenses.
Former Section 46-1-10 (decree final in 6 months, separate final
decree not required) is eliminated. See new Section 46-1-9.
Old Section 46-1-12 (applicability to pre-1933 proceedings) goes
out as no longer necessary. See new Section 10.
Former Section 46-1-13 (policy to resolve divorce actions) is repealed. The new policy (favoring reconciliation) is set forth in the
opening section of the 1958 law.
Old Section 46-1-14 (one year to set aside divorce, except for lack
of jurisdiction or fraud on court) is eliminated. R.C.P. applies as in
other civil actions.
EFFECTIVE DATE -

EARLIER ACTIONS

By Section 46-1-11 of the new law, the act "shall take effect and be
in force from and after July 1, 1958." It is submitted that the safest interpretation is that July 2 is the effective date.
Section 46-1-10 of the 1958 law makes its provisions apply only to
actions commenced after the effective date: "Statutes in effect prior to
the effective date of this act shall apply to all actions commenced prior
to said date."
7

Doty v. Doty, 103 Colo. 543, 88 P.2d 573

(1939).
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OIL AND GAS AS MINERALS WITHIN AGRANT

OR RESERVATION
By EDWARD S.

BARLOCK

Edward S. Barlock received his B.S. in
Law from the University of Denver College of Law in 1957. He is a senior in
the College of Law and is Editor in
Chief of DICTA. This note was awarded
first prize in a writing competition at the
law school sponsored by the Rocky
Mounfain Mineral Law Foundation.

For many years a continuing source of oil and gas litigation has
been a deed, usually an old one, containing a grant or reservation of
"minerals," but not mentioning oil and gas, alt-iough often enumerating one or more other specific minerals. Such a deed ordinarily gives rise
to no controversy until oil or gas is discovered, and in most cases this
does not happen until many years have elapsed since the original conveyance containing the grant or reservation was made. If the landowner
had expressly granted oil and gas or if he had expressly reserved oil and
gas from the conveyance of his land, the subject matter of the grant or
reservation could not be questioned. But where, as in the cases we are
going to consider, the grantor has used the term "minerals" and has not
used the words "oil and gas," it at once becomes a question as to whether
oil and gas are included within the grant or reservation.2
NATURE OF THE LANDOWNER'S INTEREST

Various interests may be disposed of by the owner of a fee simple
in mineral lands. He has all of the rights recognized by the law in both
the surface and in the minerals. He may, if he wishes, transfer all of his
rights in the entire premises, or he may sever all or a part of the minerals
or his rights therein from the remainder of his estate.' He can carve out
various interests either by granting his general estate with an exception or
reservation of mineral rights, or by granting the minerals, or the
I IA Summers, 041 And Gas § 135, p. 263 (Perm ed. 1954).
Ibid.

3 Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co. 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934)
(grantor's severance of mineral rights held binding upon his subsequent grantee of
land); Harris v. Currie, 142 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 302 (1943)

(grantor's conveyance in or-

dinary form of deed containing no exception or reservation passed title to the grantee
and such title included all minerals).
Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Carseloway, 45 i.2d 744 (10th Cir. 1930); Adams V.
Riddle, 233 Ala. 96, 170 So. 343 (1946).
5 Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934).
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surface alone.' He can sell all, a segregated part, or an undivided
interest in the minerals.7 And, of course, his grants can extend to different kinds of minerals, or to different strata of minerals, so that there
can be as many owners as-there are kinds and strata of minerals. Because such control over the type and extent of the interest conveyed is
possible, the intent with which a particular conveyance is made will
extend or limit the interest conveyed or reserved depending upon the
language employed and the pertinent facts and circumstances.
DEFINITION

OF THE WORD MINERAL

W\hen the general term "mineral" is used in a grant or reservation,
its meaning must necessarily depend upon the intent with which it is
used.' In a strict sense the words "oil and gas" are not included within
the meaning of the word "mineral" because oil and gas are classed scientifically as hydrocarbon compounds." But in Sellars v. Ohio Valley
Trust Co.," the court asserted that the term "minerals" included oil and
,gas.even though in a strict sense oil and gas were properly classed as
,hydrocarbon compounds." To apply the term "minerals" in its narrow
signification to a grant of land containing an exception or reservation
,of minerals might prove absurd, because in a broad sense oil and gas
must logically be termed minerals since they are neither aninal nor
vegetable."
Some courts prefer to define oil and gas as minerals on the ground
that the term includes every inorganic substance extracted from the
earth for profit." A number of other authorities adopt the definition
that a mineral is any natural substance having sufficient value to be
6 "The owner of the entire estate in land may convey the minerals therein
separately from the surface. C-rov rsely, he may convey the surface separately from
the minerals." Harris v. Curr e,
42 Tex. 93, 176 S.W.2d 304 (1943).
Sullivan, Oil And Gas. p. 2C4 (1955).
O Delaware & HL Canal Co. v. Hughes, 183 Pa. 66, 38 AtI. 568 (1897).
United States ex rel and for Use of Tennessee Valley Authority v. Harris, 115
F.2d 343, 344 (5th Cir. 1940) (the meaning of the term minerals is to be determined
from the language of the grant or reservation, the surrounding circumstances and the
intention of the grantor).
10 Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.-,T. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
11248 S.W.2d 897 (Ky. App. 1952).
12 "Strictly speaking, oil and gas are not minerals, but hydrocarbon compounds.
However, in a broad sense they may be and are termed minerals. So when the word
"minerals" is used without qualifications, it is construed as covering all organic and
inorganic substances that can be taken from the earth." Id. at 899.
13 Silver v. Bush, 213 Pa. 195, 62 Atl. 832 (1906).
14 Stowers v.
Huntington Development & Gas Co.. 72 F.2d 969 (4th Cir. 1934);
McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Gas Co., 134 Ky. 239, 120 S. W. 314 (1909);
Suit v. A. Hochstetter Oil Co.. 63 -A. Va. 317, 61 S.E. 307 (1908).
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nined, quarried or extracted for its own sake or for its own specific
use.1" Under these broad definitions the term "minerals" has been held

1"
to include oil and gas in a long line of decisions. These decisions have
set a common standard of meaning for the term, and the courts are almost
unanimous in holding that a conveyance or reservation of "minerals"
of evidence of a contrary intention
includes oil and gas, in the absence
1
indicating a more restricted use. 7

TKE KENTUCKY VIEW

The question as to whether oil and gas has been included in a grant
or reservation of "minerals" has been litigated in the Kentucky courts
many times.'" In the decisions reported from that jurisdiction the view
taken with respect to the question under consideration is certainly rep°
resentative of the majority position, and an analysis of the Kentucky
cases affords an understanding of the basic distinctions between cases
following the majority view and cases purporting to do so and vet holding
that oil, gas, or both, are not included within a particular grant or reservation of "minerals."
In Scott v. Laws, 0 under what was labeled the majority rule, it was
held that a conveyance of' "all the mineral right, and coal privileges and
rights of way to and from said minerals and coal privileges, also the right
1 1
to search for all undiscovered minerals and coals,'' included all inorganic substances which were capable of being taken from the land, and
that to restrict the meaning of the term "minerals" there must be some
qualifying words or language indicating that the parties did not intend
such a broad meaning. " " The instant case was distinguished from the
"
case of McKinney's Heirs v. Central Kentucky Natural Gas Co., in which
the
contained
which
conveyance
by
a
pass
not
gas
did
that
it was held
clause "all minerals such as coal, iron, silver, gold, col)per, lead, bismuth,
antimony, zinc or any other ra incral of any marketable value.""
Is the distinction drawn between the Scott and McKinney cases
sound? The ground upon which the distinction was made was that in
ilcKinney the words "any other material of any marketable value" were
to be read in connection with the minerals previously enumerated and
"
were confined to minerals of the same character.2 Apparently the enumerated minerals were considered to be of a character different from gas.
.

355 (1)897).
- Murray v. Allred. 100 Tenn. 100. 43 S.W
161Brown v. Spilman. 15., U.S. 665 (1895): Lovelace v. Southwestern Petroleum Co.,
267 Fed. 513 (6th Cir. 1920); Stowers v. Huntington Development & Gas Co.. 72 F.2d
969 (4th Cir. 1934): Oshorn v. Arkansas Territorial Oil Co., 103 Ark. 175, 146 S.V. 122
Co. v. Strohacker, 202 Ark. 645, 152 S.W.2d 557 (1941);
(1912); Missouri Pac. RH.
Cornwell v. Buck & Stoddard, 28 Cal. App. 2d 333. 82 P.2d 516 (1938) (holding that
while oil and gas are minerals their production is not mining): West Virginia Gas
Co. v. Preece. 260 Ky. 601, 86 S.W,.2nd 163 (1935); Calhoun v. Ardis. 144 La. 3.11, 80 So.
Wagner v. Mlallorv, 169 N.Y. 501, N.E. 564 (1902); Norman v. Lewis, 100
548 (1918:)
W. Va. 429. 130 S.E. 913 (1925).
17 See cases collected in IA Summers, Oil And Gas § 135, p. 271 (Perm ed. 1954).
's See Kentucky cases collected in Annot., 37 A.L.R. 2d 1440 (1955).
19 See cases collected in IA Summers, Oil And Gas § 135, p. 269 (Perm ed. 1954).
1o 185 Ky. 440, 215 S.W. 81 (1919).
2- 215 S. . at 51.
215 SAW. at 82.
23 134 Ky. 239 120 S.W\. 314 (1909).
2 120 SWv. 314 (emphasis supplied).
25 215 S.-W. at 82.
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In the Scott case the only mineral expressly mentioned was coal and
the court held that "all mineral right" included oil and gas.
The decision in McKinney has not been considered to be a departure
from the majority view, with the exception that Pennsylvania claims that
it represents the minority view."' Thus, in Lovelace v. Southwestern
2
Petroleum Co., 2' a federal court discussed the McKinney case ' and said
2
court
The
federal
rule.
'
the
general
opposed
to
was
not
that it plainly
also indicated that McKinney was construed as being in the ejusdem
generis class.
Perhaps the distinction drawn by the Kentucky cases is best understood in the light of the following language used in the McKinney case.
"It will be observed that gas is not specifically mentioned
in either of the deeds, but in all of them the word 'minerals' is
used, which counsel for the parties concede, when given its
broadest meaning, includes natural gas. But the question to be
determined is: What was the intention of the parties to the
deeds at the time they were made?."
The holding was, no doubt, based partly on the opinion that the
long list of enumerated minerals evidenced an intention not to include
gas, because it would appear to be common sense that if it were the intention of the parties to include gas, they would have added it to the
list of enumerated minerals. This position was no doubt strengthened
by the fact that the easements accompanying the grant were inapplicable to the production of oil or gas.
Another Kentucky case which is worthy of mention is Lambert
v. Prichett," ' a 1955 case, where the controversy was over the scope of a
reservation in a certain deed to the effect that "no coal or mining rights
are hereby conveyed." It was held that the words "mining rights" following a reference to coal must be considered as having been used in
their ordinary sense and related to the specific mineral mentioned. But
in Murray v. Allred, "- where the common predecessor in title of both
the defendant and the complainant conveyed to the defendant's remote
grantor the land in question, reserving "all mines, minerals, and metals
in and under the land," it was held that the reservation included oil.
The court pointed out that the true meaning of the word "mineral" included oil and gas and was to be determined from dictionaries and other
similar authorities. " The minority view, as enunciated in Dunham v.
Kirkpatrick,3 ' was disapproved in clear and emphatic language."
OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Generally speaking, and with the exception of Pennsylvania, every
jurisdiction which has passed upon the problem of whether oil and gas
are included within an exception or grant of "minerals" has purported
to follow the rule that oil and gas are included, unless from the lanv. South Penn Oil Co. 238 Pa. 301, 86 At.
(6th ,ir, 1920).
2V7 Fed, 51
at 517, 518.
-Id.
Id at 518.
at 317.
120 SA.,
31 284 S.-W.2d 90 (Ky. 1955).
3 100 Ky. 100, 43 S.W. 355 (1897).
Id. at 117, 43 S W. at 359.
36 (1882).
', 101 Pa.
43 S.V. at 3.59.
38-Preston
27

203, 204 (1913).
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guage of the instrument, or from the surrounding circumstances at the
time it was executed, it is concluded that the term was used in a less
inclusive sense."" The cases commented upon in this section are examples
of this general rule.
Branham v. Miear" involved a determination by the Texas Court
of Civil Appeals of the meaning of a reservation of "any minerals on
said land." The court made the observation that the cases seemed conclusive and that the reservation in the deed in question undoubtedly
meant all minerals, including oil and gas. The question was deemed
to be so well settled that the court found it unnecessary to cite any
authorities."
3
It was held, in Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp.,"
that a conveyance of "all the coal and minerals of every description" embraced oil
and gas. The rule laid down was that under normal circumstances a conveyance or exception of minerals will include natural gas in place and
oil, in the absence of proof of a contrary intent.'"

THE PENNSYLVANIA VIEW

An early Pennsylvania case, Dunham v. Kirkpatrick," held that a
reservation of' "all timber suitable for sawing, also all minerals" (lid not
include oil and gas. The court recognized that oil was considered to be
a mineral, in a broad sense of the term' 2 but reasoned that in popular
estimation it was not so regarded, and that the parties must have intended to use the term mineral in a sense based upon the ideas of everyday life." Perhaps the holding in the case is not too far out of line with
the majority view, but the reasons advanced by the court to sustain
its position were poorly stated and reflect the weakness of its position.
The particular language of the court from which the instant conclusion
is drawn is:
"They [the parties] were, doubtless, at that time unaware of the character of the property as oil territory. But if
they did entertain such an idea, and expected to reserve oil
Linder the general term 'mineral,' they were mistaken, and
should have known that they were using that word in a manner
not sanctioned by the common understanding of mankind,
hence, in a manner that could not be approved by the courts

of justice.""
Later Pennsylvania cases have adhered to this same view, but the
reasons given for the following Dunham are based partially on the
doctrine of stare decisis, as is indicated in the other cases which have
entrenched the minority view more deeply into the law of that juris-

diction.
Dunhan was followed in Silver v. Bush," where it was held that
a reservation of "the mineral underlying" the land conveyed did not include natural gas, and that the grantee tinder the deed was entitled to it.
30 See note 16 supra.
:17199

S.NV.2d 841 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947).
aS Id. at 845, 846.
3, 166 Va. 524, 186 S.E. 20 (1936).
40 186 S.E. at 22.
41 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
12 Id. at 43.
4 I d. at 44.
44 Ibid.
45 213 Pa. 195, 62 AtI. 832 (1906).
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The court advanced the position that although such natural gas was a

mineral in the broadest sense of' the term, evidence was needed to establish that the parties intended to include gas within the reservation."
Since there was no evidence on that point in the record, the minority
rule was again applied. It was stated that the Dunham decision was
a part of the law of the state when the deed was executed and to some
extent at least had become a rule of property on which many titles in
western Pennsylvania depended."
And, following Dunham and Silver, the court held in Preston v.
South Penn. Oil Co.,"8 that a reservation of "all minerals and mining
rights and the incidents thereto," did not include oil and natural gas, in
the absence of a showing of an intent to include them. Again it was
pointed out that the rule in Dunham had become a rule of property and
would not be disturbed. " An additional comment was that the decisions
in other jurisdictions were not harmonious on the question before the
court, and that the Pennsylvania view had been followed in Detlor v.
Holland,; an 1898 Ohio case, and in McKinney v. Central Kentucky
Natural Gas Co.," discussed earlier.
Once again in Bundy v. Ayers'" a 1953 decision, a reservation of
"oil, coal, fire clay, and minerals of every kind and character," was held
not to include natural gas. The court said that in Pennsylvania there
is a rebuttable presumption that when the word "mineral" is used in a
(teed, reservation or exception, it does not include oil or gas."5 The court
rejected the contention that gas should be included under the doctrine
of ejusdem generis, and pointed out that if gas had been intended to be
included, "then why was the oil expressly reserved?"".
Ohio is the only other jurisdiction that has relied on the Dunham
decision. In Detlor v. Holland," it was decided that a grant of "all the
coal of every variety, and all the iron ore, fire clay, and other valuable
minerals, in, on, or under" the land did not include oil and gas. The
decision was based upon what was called the correct rule of construction
and upon the authority of the Dunham case."
Although it might have been asserted that in Detlor the Ohio court
had followed the minority view, the question was settled in Jividen v.
New Pittsburgh Coal Co., 5' where it was held that oil and gas were included within a reservation which read: "This deed is to convey the
surface only . . . [the grantors] reserve all coal and other minerals, with
the right to mine and haul the same ... ."" The Detlor case was distinguished and the court espoused the general rule that the term "minerals"
includes oil and gas, in the absence of a showing of a contrary intent."
46 62 At. at 833.
7 Ibid.
s 218 Pa. 301. 86 Atl. 203 (1913).
4" 86 Atl. at 204.
, .7 Ohio St. 492. 49 N.E. 690 (1898).
SSee note 21 supra.
372 Pa.. 533. 94 A.2d 724 (1953).
.8 94 A.2d at 725.
td. at 726.
S,5o note 48 snupt.
49 N.E. 692, 693.
7 187 N.E. 124 (Ohio 1933).
;,s
Id. at 125.
51 ibid.
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There is no Colorado case which has decided the question whether
a grant or reservation of' "minerals" includes oil and gas. But in Farrell v. Sayer," the Colorado Supreme Court did decide that a reservation "excepting and reserving all minerals and all mineral rights and
rights to enter upon the surface of the land and extract the same" did not
include ordinary sand and gravel. The rule set out in the opinion was
that the word "minerals" when found in a reservation means substances
exceptional in use, value and character, and does not include the ordinary soil found on the land and common to the area where the land is
situate."
Although the Farrell case did not involve oil and gas, the opinion
does indicate that the court considered substances exceptional in use,
Value and character to come within the purview of the term "minerals,"
when used in a grant or reservation. The interesting question presented
is, thereftore, whether oil and gas are substances falling under the court's
definition. They appear to fit the requirements laid down by the court.
The question will be of considerable interest to oil and gas lawyers
when the time arrives f'or the Colorado view to be enunciated. That time
is not far away, for there is presently before the Colorado Supreme Court
an action involving a claim to oil and gas arising out of a deed containing a reservation of' "the exclusive right to prospect for coal and other
minerals."'
PARTICULAR LANGUAGE AND CIRCUNI STANCES

A substantial number of cases involving the question we have been
considering have been decided under the rule that intention controls."
Consequently, it is ilmportant to understand the rule that: when f'om the
language of the instrument, or fron the facts and circumstances at the
time of its execution, it appears that the parties did not have oil and gas
in mind, a grant or reservation of1 minerals will not include oil and gas. "
If the cases which seem to have departed from the general rule are viewed
in relation to this principle they may be entirely consistent.
The case of Moron Coal Co. v. Riggs"5 is an example of a situation
in which the courts will apply the principle that intention governs. In
this case the Indiana court recognizecd the rule that oil and gas are
included within a1 reservation of' minerals, in the absence of a contrary
intention. However, it held that a deed of' "all the coal, fire clay and
minerals underlying the surface' of' the land in question was ambiguous
and required the introduction of' parol evidence. From the evidence
so let in the court determined that the patties had not intended to include
oil and gas.
But in Shell Oil Co. v. Moore,"6 a deed of "the surface only" of the
land in question, reserving to the grantor the right to mine and remove
"all the coal and other minerals underlying said land," was held to reserve to the grantor the ownership of' the oil and gas, the right to explore
for it, and the right to use the surface to obtain it. The court observed
611129 Colo. 36S, 270 f'.2d 190 (1954).
'1 Id. at 373, 270 P.2d at 192.
112Radke v. Union Pacific R., No. 18254.

,IA
Summers, Oil And Gas § 135. p. 278 (ljerin ed. 1954).
- Ibid.
115 Ind. App. 236. 56 N.E.2d 672 (1944).
0382
111. 556, 4S N.E.2d 400 (1943).
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that it regarded oil and gas as minerals, and that rule, coupled with the
fact that only the surface was included within the grant, led the court
to the conclusion that the mineral estate and the right to explore for
oil and gas were left in the grantor.
Riggs and Moore do not represent inconsistent viewpoints. Quite
the contrary, they represent the rule that the intent of the parties indicated from the language of the instrument and from the surrounding
facts and circumstances will control.
Where the language in a grant or reservation is unusual, the cases
indicate that a fine line is drawn. No general standard is controlling,
and common sense seems to be the best guide. Thus, it has been held
that the language "excluding all the mineral on said land, excluding all
the timber that belongs to [a former grantor]" is ambiguous, 7 and
evidence is admissible to show that oil and gas were not intended.
In other difficult cases, it has been held that an exception of "mineral deposits" includes oil and gas," against the objection that although
oil and gas may be minerals they are not "deposits"; that a reservation
of "coal, mineral, stone, or any other mineral deposits" includes oil and
Kentucky Coke Co. v. Keystone Gas Co., 296 Fed.
68 Roth v. 1-user, 147 Kan. 433, 76 P.2d 871 (1938).
67
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gas; " that a grant of "coal and mining rights" does not convey oil and
gas. 0
In some cases either the word oil or the word gas,
specifically mentioned together with the term minerals.
arises it is usually contended that the inclusion of one
clusion of the other. On this point the cases are in

but not both, are
\Vhen such a case
results in the exhopeless conflict.

It has been held that the word "mineral" in an exception of "mineral and timber and oil" includes natural gas, where there is nothing
to show a contrary intention."1 Another case held that a reservation of
"all minerals, mineral substances and oil of every sort and description"
included natural gas." But a reservation of "all oil privileges" has been
held not to include natural gas. ' '
AP'LICATION OF TiHl RUIE or EJusDIEM GENE RIS

In addition to the problem arising out of a situation where either oil
or gas is specifically mentioned to the exclusion of the other, the enumeration of one or more specific minerals in conjunction with the general
term "minerals," presents a problem of construction. Sometimes the
courts consider the enulmeration to be indicative of an intent to omit
oil and gas, or of an ambiguity. This frequently leads to the specific
question of the applicability of the doctrine of ejusdem generis."
A reservation of "the exclusive right to the iron, coal and other minerals" was held not to include oil and gas in a 1922 Louisiana decision.-,In reaching the decision the court applied the rule of ejusdem generis
and pointed out that the words "other minerals" following the specific
terms "coal and iron" were to be construed as including minerals of a

character similar to coal and iron, such as solids or ninerals in place.
In contrast with the Louisiana case just mentioned, the case of
Shell Oil Co. v. Dyel held that oil and gas were included in a conveyance of "all the coal and ether minerals in, on and under" the land.
The court refused to apply the doctrine of ejusdem generis and took the
position that the naming of one specific mineral, namely coal, was not
an enumeration. The court also mentioned that coal and oil had some
common characteristics, since they were both used for fuel and were,
from a technical viewpoint, both hydrocarbons.
An interesting observation was made in Federal Gas, Oil & Coal Co.
v. Moore,-,
where the court stated that it was within the common knowledge of mankind that oil is usually found in salt water and that, therefore, a conveyance of "all the coal, saltwater and minerals" included oil
and gas."0 The doctrine of ejusdem generis did not operate to exclude
oil and gas, and extrinsic evidence was inadmissible.
09
70

Rio Bravo Oil Co. v. MeEntire. 128 Tex. 124. 95 S.V.2d 381 (1936).
Easley v. Melton. 262 S.AV.2d 686 (Ky. 1953).

71 252 Ky. 17, 66 S.AV.2d 19 (1933).
-2Dingess v. Huntington Development & Gas Co., 271 Fed. 864 (4th Cir. 1921).
I' Murphy v. Vanvoorhis, 94 \v. Va. 475, 119 S.E. 297 (1923).
74 "In
the construction of laws, wills and other instruments, the 'ejusdem generis
rule' is, that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by
words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying to persons or things of
the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned." Black, Law Dictionary
(4th ed. 1951).
75 Huie Hodge Lumber Co. v. Railroad Land Co.. 151 La. 197, 91 So. 676 (1922).
76 135 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1943).
77 290 Ky. 284, 161 S.J.2d 46 (1942).
Is 161 S.W.2d at 48.
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A deed to a railroad of a right-of-way 'together with the right to
take and use all the timber, earth, stone and mineral" was held not to
convey the oil under the land.'" The ground on which the court based
its decision was that the interest granted was the right-of-way and the
facilities necessary to the efficient use of that right, and that under the
rule of ejusdem generis, the word "mineral" should lie applied to the
same class of substance as the particular words indicated.
Similarly, a reservation of "all the minerals, coals, together with all
the necessary rights of way" was held not to exclude oil and gas when
read in connection with the provision "to mine, excavate, and transport
the same.""' The court concluded that the deed, when read as a whole,
and the word "coals" immediately following the term 'minerals," incicated an intention on the part of the grantor to limit or restrict the meaning of the more comprehensive term "minerals," and that the only
nineral actually reserved was coal.
The cases which have been placed in the ejusdem generis class might
seem inconsistent if the language employed in the instruments of conveyance is alone considered, but they may appear quite consistent when
analyzed from the viewpoint that intention is a factor of major importance. This is indicated in the last-mentioned case, where the court observed that both intent and the specific language of the instriument were
to be considered.
CONCILUSION

The question whether oil and gas are included in a grant or reserva-.
tion of "minerals" has been litigated many times. The continuing discovery of oil on newly explored lands affords ample background for this
type of litigation and the courts are constantly being called upon to decide the question. An over-all survey of the cases indicates that there is
a great deal of consistency among the decisions. The Pennsylvania view
has not gained a following, and the courts are practically unanimous in
holding that oil and gas are included in a grant or reservation of "mineraIs," unless it appears from the language of the deed, or from the facts
and circumstances existing at the time of its execution, that oil and gas
were not intended to be included. The apparent inconsistency in some
of the decisions is best explained in light of the cardinal principle that
intention governs.
106 Tex. 94. 157 S.\V. 737 (1913).

Horse Creek Latnd & Mining Co. v.

lidkiff. 81 AV. Va. 616, 95 S.E. 26 (1918).
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i. INTRODUCTION

The complexity of modern civilization has added a new dimension
to the age old problem and tension between freedom and restraint. Under
constitutional government the courts are called upon to resolve tensions
that exist between the rights of the individual and the legitimate needs
and welfare of society. Legal cases involving freedom of speech, freedom
of religion, subversive activity, and criminal due process provide eloquent
and vital material on the constitutional rights of man in modern society.
The problem of licensing of occupations involves questions of constitutional and administrative law which affect large numbers of persons in
their every-day lives. The licensing problem is not likely to arouse as much
general interest in the minds of the public at large as are the constitutional issues mentioned above. Nevertheless this problem by its mere
quantitative importance deserves one's attention.
A license has been defined as "a permit to do a certain thing; it
confers a right to do that which without the license would be unlawful."
Three questions present themselves. First, does the legislature have the
power to license a particular occupation? Second, assuming that the legislature has the power to license an occupation, to what extent can this
power be delegated to subordinate licensing officials, and in what manner can it be exercised? Third, what changes in Colorado's licensing
statutes should be recommended?

1I. THE LEGISLATIVE POWER To LICENSE
A Wisconsin judge in 1941 expressed alarm at a certain piece of
legislation, which, if sustained, would mean that "we have taken a long
1 Gronert v. People, 95 Colo. 508, 51], 37 P.2d 396, 398 (1934);
Colo. 489, 493, 39 Pac. 341, 342 (1895).

People v. Raims, 20
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step in becoming a nation of licensees instead of a nation of free men."'
The legislature cannot license at will, but the purpose of the licensing
must le connected in some way to the public's health, safety, welfare, or
morals. It must le necessary or desirable in one of these spheres of the
public interest.
In Colorado as elsewhere it is obvious that the licensing of the professions is well within the state's licensing power. The activity of a
professional man not only affects those with whom he deals directly,
but it affects the public as a whole. An unqualified or dishonest lawyer
injures not only his clients and specific adversaries, but he also pollutes
the stream of justice. A professional man requires special knowledge
and skills; the exercise of these attributes can be rightly regulated in the
public interest and welfare. The Colorado Supreme Court has declared
that there is no absolute property right to engage in such professions as
law, medicine, and dentistry.' But of course that list is not exclusive
and the increase in technology will probably see the list expanded.
In protecting the public health and moral the legislature itself,
or a municipality through a grant of power from the legislature, has the
right to license such institutions as hospitals, taverns, and even dance
halls where only soft drinks are served.' It cannot be reasonably maintained that licensing poses a problem of over-regulation in this area, and
the legislative power here seems to be certain.
The above situations are clear. It is when one enters the field of
semi-skilled trades that the question ef whether or not the licensing of
an occupation is within the police power becomes more difficult to
answer. Of course, one can always search for a reason why a certain occupation bears some relationship to the health, safety, welfare, or morals
of the public. But the courts demand somcthing more t'han this-the
relationship must be reasonable and real, and not merely a fiction. The
North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the licensing of tile contractors in a ringing opinion which declared, "The Act in question here
has as its main and controlling purpose, not health, not safety, not morals,
not welfare, but a tight control of tile contracting in perpetuity by those
already in the business .... .. ' Statutes in other states licensing such
persons as photographers,' and real estate brokers7 have been declared
unconstitutional as bearing no reasonable relationship to the police
power.
interestingly enough, no Colorado case has invalidated the licensing
of any occupation as such. The right to license plumbers,' pawnbrokers,'
and barbers" impliedly has been upheld. There is no statewide statutory
requirement for the licensing of cleaners and dyers, but the act regulating their practices, which is in effect indirect licensing, has been declared constitutional.'" This would seem to indicate that the Colorado
2 State v. Neveau, 237 Wis. 85, 294 N.WV. 796 (1940), rehearing denied, 237 Wis. 108,
296 N.W. 622 (1941).
3 People v. Painless Parker Dentist, 85 Colo. 304, 275 Pa.
928 (1929), cert. denied,
280 U.S. 566 (1929).
4 Dwyer v. People, 82 Colo. 574, 261 Pae. S58 (1927); Downes v. McClellan, 72 Colo.
904, 210 Pac. 397 (1922).
v. Allen, 245 N.C. 516, 525, 96 S.E.2d 851, 859 (1957).
'Roller
* State v. Lawrence, 213 N.C. 674, 197 S.E. 586 (1938).
7 State v. Harris, 216 N.C. 746, 6 S.E.2d 854 (1940).
s People v. Rogers, 74 Coio. 184, 219 Pac. 1076 (1923).
•) Provident Loan Society v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 Pac. 10 (1918).
10 Denver v. Schmid, 98 Colo. 32, 52 P.2d 388 (1935).
11 People ex rel. Attorney General v. Barksdale, 104 Colo. 1, 87 P.2d 755 (1939).
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Supreme Court has not felt compelled to seek too far for a reason to
connect an occupation, in some way, to the safety, health, welfare, or
morals of the public. The court has declared that even the public financial safety is a legitimate concern of' the police power."a That being so,
the court would probably uphold the validity of the legislative power
to license real estate brokers and salesmen, sectIrities dealers, insurance
agents and brokers, and occupations of a similar nature.
Though the court has been liberal in finding that occupations are
properly subject to the police power of the state, it has been strict in
determining which occupations the legislature or the municipalities
have intended to be licensed. Thus it has been held that a municipal
ordinance requiring the licensing of insurance brokers does not apply
to insurance agents." Similarly, a licensed engineer will not be allowed to
exercise the privileges accorded to architects.'
It can be seen that a
narrow construction applied to the stattutorv deflinition of an occupation
will cut both ways as it affects the licensee. In one case he cannot be
licensed at all and need not be since he falls outside the definition. But
neither can one expand his occupational definition to include more than
that afforded by the statute.
Another basic principle of licensing occupations is that the requirements imposed treat all persons within the class alike." Likewise arbitrary and discriminatory license fees are invalid." A Denver ordinance,
for example, required every coal dealer to put up a $1000 bond or give
evidence of financial responsibility sufficient to pay for any damages
arising out of the operation of his business. It further required a license
fee of $100 for the operation of one office within Denver and for one
truck, and $5 for each additional truck. No license would be issued
unless the coal dealer maintained an office in Denver. The court struck
(town the ordinance on the ground that it was discriminatory against
coal dealers whose establishments were located outside of Denver. The
court further declared that the ordinance had been passed for the sole
benefit of Denver coal merchants.'"
But in applying this rule against non-discrimination, the court has
been perfectly willing to give a narrow construction to the class enumerated in the statute or ordinance. Thus a statute requiring money
lenders whose interest rates were above 12% to obtain a license was not
held to be discriminatory even thCough the statute did not apply to banks,
trust companies, building and loan associations, or title and guarantee
associations. These latter groups' interest rates were lower than 12%
and they were already subject to governmental supervision.' Similarly,
a Denver ordinance pro%idling that each gasoline filling station would be
required to pay an annual iense fee ci $25 for one gasoline dispenser
Plus a $10 license fee for each additional dispenser was upheld as not
being discriminatory even though garages which had gasoline dispensers
were not required to pay the license fee.'- It is permissible to recognize
a distinction between dispensers at filling stations and those in garages.
'a"
Zeigler v. People, 109 Colo. 252, 124, P.2d 593 (1942); cf. United States Building
ind Loan Ass'n. v. McClelland. 95 Colo. 292, 36 P2d 164 (1934).
12 Bernheimer v. Leadville, 14 Colo. 518, 24 Pac. 332 (1890).
13 Heron v. Denver, 131 Colo. 501, 283 P.2d 647 (1955).
14 Houston v. Kirschwing, 117 Colo. 92, 184 P.2d 487 (1947); 33 Am. Jur., Licenses
2 30 (1942).
15 Ibid.
16 Houston v. Kirschwing. Note 14 supra.
17 Cavanaugh v. People, 61 Colo. 292, 157 Pac. 200 (1916).
S Hollenbeck v. Denver, 97 Colo. 370, 49 P.2d 435 (1935).
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The former are essential in a separate and distinct business, while tile
latter are merely incidental to the primary operation. Tile classes, therefore, are separate and there is no discrimination when the filling station
operator must pay the fee and the garage man need not.
Ill. DELEGATION OF LEGISIATIVE POWER
To some the doctrine against the delegation of legislative power
seems outworn. It has been said that it is little more than a judicial
corollary of laissez-faire which is no longer suited to the needs of the
positive conception of government." Harold Laski wrote that he would
see the delegation extended rather than grudgingly conceded. 2 ' In 1916
Elihu Root, then president of the American Bar Association, asserted
that "tile old doctrine of prohibiting the delegation of legislative power
has virtually retired from tile field and given up the fight."' Root proved
to be too pessimistic in his prognostication. The prohibition against
delegation continues to be a well respected judicial concept which remains firmly entrenched in our law.
It might be argued that state courts merely pay "lip service" to the
doctrine, but then go on to hold that the particular legislation in cuestion does not involve delegation, or if it does, it is not of such a kind
that violates the essence of the doctrine. It is, of course, true that most
contested legislation has been upheld. But such a fact should not lead
one to the erroneous conclusion that the non-delegation doctrine is dying.
It continues to assert its vigor.
The doctrine is fairly easy to describe; its interpretation and application in a particular fact situation is often difficult. The prohibition
against the delegation of legislative power is a corollary of the separation
of powers into legislative, executive, and judicial functions. To use Mr.
Justice Holmes's terms, the distinctions and functions of each branchof the government cannot be divided into "watertight compartments."'
A certain blending is inevitable. But still each branch mLust (IOits own
job and not encroach upon the functions of the other branches nor abdicate its roles to the others. The legislative is to legislate, that is, to declare the policies and make the law. The executive is to execute. Here
arises the age old problem-where to draw the distinction and the line
between what is legislating and what is administering. The administrative body must only act within the authority delegated to it by the legislature under standards clearly fixed by law; it has no discretion to
declare what the law is. 2 '
One of Colorado's earliest cases on the delegation problem was Colorado and Southern Railway v. State Railroad Commission.-" There the
court held that the authority granted to the commission to prescribe
reasonable time schedules for the operation of trains and to prevent
unreasonable discrimination between commnities with respect to railroad service was not an invalid delegation of legislative power. Other
Colorado cases have upheld the power of the Industrial Commission to
determine "prevailing standards of working hours and conditions in
19 Davis, Administrative Law, p. 58 (1951).
20 Report on Ministers' Powers, Cmd. 4060, p. 137 (1936) quoted in Jaffe, An Essay
on Delegation of Legislative Power, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 359, 375 (1947).
21 41 A.B.A.R. 355, 368-369 (1916).
22 Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 211 (1928) (dissenting opinion).
23 Union Pacific v. Oil and Gas Conservation Comm., 131 Colo, 528, 284 P.2d 242
(1955).
24 54 Colo. 64, 129 Pac. 506 (1912).
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the printing industry" in order that those contracting with the state tor

printing should observe them, - 5 the right of tile Industrial Commission
to set minimum prices for tile cleaning and dyeing trade,'-; and the right
of certain administrative bodies to determine and prescribe reorganized
boundaries for school districts.21 Colorado's Industrial Recovery Act 21
was declared unconstitutional upon the basis of the Schechter case,"
and the Melon Inspection Act"° was struck down isinvolving improper
delegation, the court saying, "It cannot be said that the work of inspecting melons is of such a technical nature or so intricate that it cannot be
prescribed by definite rules, specifications, classifications and standards.'",

When it comes to the licensing problem as such, the Colorado Snprenle Court has insisted upon definite standards. In Prouty v. Heron,"
the plaintiff had been licensed to practice engineering in 1921. He thereafter left the state and returned in 1945. At that time he applied for a
registration card as a professional engineer. He was given a card which
stated that he was qualified to practice civil engineering. Plaintiff protested the limitation and requested a license without the civil engineering
classification, but his request was refused. The statute' :' which regulated
the licensing of engineers did not define any of the branches of engineering which it enumerated. There were no standards in the act which
could be applied in determining the distinctions to be drawn between
them. The statute on that count alone would have been objectionable,
but there were other flaws as well. A professional engineer had to have
completed an approved engineering curriculum of four or more years,
or have been graduated from a school or college approved by the Board
as of satisfactory standing. An applicant had to have an additional four
or more years of experience in engineering work of a character satisfactory to the Board and in its discretion the Board might give credit not in
excess of one year for satisfactory graduate study in engineering. The
Smith-Brooks Printing Co. v. Young, 103 Colo. 199, 204, 85 P.2d 39, 41 (1938).
26 People ex rel. Attorney General v. B3arksdale, supra.
'7 Hazlet v. Gaunt, 126 Colo. 385, 250 P.2d 188 (1952).
28 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1935, c. 89.
29 In
re Interrogatories of the Governor, 97 Colo. 52S, 51 P.2d 695 (1935).
See also
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
29 Colo. Laxs
1st ]leg. Sess. 1925, c. 95, amended by Colo. Laws 1st ]leg. Sess.
1927. c. 101.
31 People v. Stanley, 90 Colo. 315. 318, 9 P.2d 288, 289 (1932).
32 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
:3 Colo. Laws 1st ]leg. Sess. 1951, c. 161.
25

HEART OF DOWNTOWN: 1409 Stout

--

TA

5-30

1 HOUR SERVICE - NOTARY AND CORPORATION SEALS
Stock Certificates, Minute Books, Stock Ledgers

ACE-KAUFFMAN
RUBBER STAMP & SEAL CO. W
The "Sampson

Punch" shears eyelets without mutilating paper
W. E. LARSON, Proprietor

DICTA

JULY-AUGUST, 1958

court rightly declared that there had been an unwarranted delegation
of authority to the Board.' Prouty is the only Colorado case in which a
licensing statute has been invalidated by application of the non-delegation doctrine.
In Chenoweth v. State Board of Medical Examiners"' the State Board
of Medical Examiners attempted to revoke a physician's license claiming
that he had violated a section of the statute that prohibited advertising
relative to any of the sexual organs. In a four-three decision the court
held the revocation was void on the ground of statutory uncertainty. In
Spears Hospital v. State Board of Health" the State Board issued a "temporary provisional license" which contained five conditions: namely,
that Spears Hospital would not receive maternity cases, that surgery
would not be performed, that drugs and mledicines would not be administered, that no contagious or infectious cases would be admitted or
treated, and finally that the name "hospital" would not be used in describing the institution. The court declared that the Board had usurped
the function of the legislature and set tip its own law in attempting to
issue, and later in attempting to revoke, a "temporary provisional license."
Nothing in the statute 17 or in the rules and regulations of the Board
authorized such a procedure. It certainly could not be justified on the
grounds of legitimate administrative discretion.
In State Board of Dental Examiners v. Savelle, " however, the court
said the power to revoke a license includes within it the power to suspend,
and thus the court corrected a mistaken assumption by the State Board
that it either must acquit a dentist charged with unprofessional conduct
or revoke his license. The court remanded the case in order that the
Board might consider the advisability of suspension rather than outright
revocation. This case also contained a rather uncertain dictum which
appeared to recognize a distinction between unprofessional conduct and
unethical conduct, implying that the latter was outside the regulatory
reach of the statute." It is seen, then, that even in the field of health,
where the courts have traditionally been more liberal in upholding administrative discretion, the Colorado Supreme Court has allowed only
the most obvious interpretation of the statutory authority conferred upon
the licensing officials.
Municipal bodies cannot enact licensing ordinances which prohibit
what already has been authorized by- the state, 0 but a municipality in
the exercise of its police powers can exact requirements in addition to
those imposed by the state."
In summarizing the court's constitutional attitude toward the licensing of professions and occupations, it is evident that it has been
generally liberal in finding justification for the existence of the power
to license. On the other hand the court has been very careful to see that
the exercise of that power is well within the statutory authorization, and
if the legislature has not been careful to provide canalized standards,
the statute will be invalidated.
Prouty v. Heron, 127 Colo. 168, 255 P.2d 755 (1953).
3557 Colo. 74, 141 Pac. 132 (1914).
36 122 Colo. 147, 220 P.2d 872 (1950).
37 Colo. Stat. Ann. c. 78, § 133-138 (1935).
38 90 Colo. 177, 8 P.2d 693 (1932).
39 Id. at 186.
40 Ray v. Denver, 109 Colo. 74, 121 P.2d 886 (1942).
41 Provident Loan Society v. Denver, 64 Colo. 400, 172 P
34

10 (1918).
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The present engineer's licensing statute" would appear to have
corrected the deficiencies noted in the Prouty case by providing definitive standards. On the other hand, for example, the licensing statute ' :
for children's boarding homes and placement agencies would very likely
be declared unconstitutional if tested in the courts. There is nothing in
this latter statute to suggest by what standards the Board of Standards
of Child Care is to determine that a foster boarding home is "suitable""
or that a placement agency is "competent and has adequate facilities.""
The board is also authorized to suspend or revoke any license issued in
the event that "minimum standards" are not maintained."' it can be
cogently argued that there is no reason why the legislature cannot delineate the standards by which the State Board of Standards for Child Care
is to be governed in the issuance o1 licenses to children's boarding homes
and placement agencies. CerItainly the subject ol foster children and
42 Colo Rev. Stat. § 51-1-12 (1953).
4.3Colo. 1-ev. S'tat. § 22-12-1 to § 22-12-7 (1953).

,-Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-12-2 (1953).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-12-4 (1953).
4o Ibid.
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their welfare admits little justification for tile delegation of wide discretionary power to a non-legislative body.
A statute upon which there has been no litigation is that dealing
with weather control.' 7 Here in a nutshell the problem of the delegation
cf legislative power comes into focus. A licensed person or corporation
who engages in weather control or cloud modification operations must
have "financial responsibility adequate to meet obligations reasonably
likely to be attached to or result from weather control activities," and
must have the "skill and experience reasonably necessary to the accomplishinent of weather control without actionable injury to property or
person.'.. What is financial responsibility? A $1000 bond deposited with
tic weather control commission? Assets worth $1,000,000? lVhat standards are to govern what a "reasonably likely" result from weather activities is to be? What criteria are to be used in ascertaining whether an
applicanit has the skill and experience "reasonably necessary"? More
uncanalized delegation of power can hardly be imagined.
But to what extent can the legislature intelligently prescribe standards within which the licensing authority can operate? Broad open-end
qualifications such as exist in the weather control statute force the commission to legislate even if' it does not desire to do so. It is easy to see
why new developments will cause the non-delegation problem to grow
rather than to lessen. But perhaps one helpful principle can be gleaned
from the decisions of the Colorado cCurt. In the exercise of delegated
powers, doubts should be resolved against the one exercising that power,
and in favor of the licensee. This is, of course, a general principle of
free government wherein that government is to exist for the benefit of
the citizen.
IV. CHANGES IN COLORADn

LICENSING STATUTES

It is beyond the scope of this note to engage in a discussion of the
procedural aspects of licensing in Colorado. A brief comment, however,
will perhaps be helpful. A cursory glance at a handful of Colorado's
statutes on licensing will reveal a senseless lack of uniformity. The licensing statute governing acccuntants specifically provides for a court
review of the board's action in revoking a license. In the event the board
is reversed, all costs are to be paid by it.'" But the statute on architects
is silent about a judicial review, though it has not been denied there
5
"
can be one. It takes a unanimous vote to revoke an architect's license, '
but only a majority vote to revoke one belonging to an engineer." An
architect can be fined no more than $200 for practicing without a license,'" but an unlicensed accountant may have to pay up to $500 and
spend a year in jail.'" N\hy should the State Board of Barber Examiners
receive $16 per day for each of its members in addition to traveling ex17 Colo. i-ev. Stat. § 1.50-1-1 to § 150-1-14 (1953).
4s Colo. Ilev. Stot. § 150-1-8 (1953).
49 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-1-19(5) (1953).
50 See Linder v. Copeland, 320 P.2d 972 (Colo., 1958). The Colorado Supreme Court
in affirming a flnver District ('onrt decision which ordered the issuance of a license
to an architect whose application had been denied twenty-four hours after being received, severely condemned the arbitrary and capricious action of the State Board of
Examiners of Architects.
51 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1-17 (1953).
52 Colo. R-ev. Stat. § 51-1-19 (1953).
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-1-15 (1953).
54Colo. Rev. Stat. § 2-1-17 (1953).
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penses," while members of the State Board of Accountancy receive "no
more" than $10 per day and traveling expenses, " and while members
of the State Board of Registration for Professional Engineers receive no
compensation, but only traveling, incidental, and clerical expenses? "
The examples in the disparity in the various licensing statutes could be
multiplied considerably.
Colorado has not yet adopted a uniform procedure act for the
creation and procedure of licensing boards and commissions. There
appears to be no reason why it should not do so. Legislation of this kind,
cOulpled with the supreme court's insistence Upon proper standards within
which licensing authorities are to operate, should go far in reducing
substantive confusion and procedural uncertainty that potentially exists
in many o1 our present licensing statutes.
55 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 15-1-4 (1953).
56 Colo. lex. Stat. § 2-1-1 (1953).
,7 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 51-1-5 (1953).
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CASE COMMENTS
Constitutional Law-Citizenship-Expatriation by voting in a
foreign political election
.By

WILBUR SATO

Wilbur Sato received his A. B. degree from the University of California. He
is a student at the University of Denver College of Law.
Petitioner, a national of the United States by birth, admitted voting
voluntarily in a 1946 Mexican political election. He was declared to have
lost his citizenship' by operation of § 401 (e) of the Nationality Act of
1940 - which provides that a citizen shall lose his citizenship by voting in a
foreign political election. Petitioner sought to have the judgment against
him reversed on the ground that the enactment of this provision was beyond the power of Congress. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed the judgment of the lower court in a five to four
decision. The Court found an implied power in Congress to enact legislation for the effective regulation of foreign affairs and held that § 401 (e)
was an appropriate means of exercising this power. The doctrine of
Voltntary expatriation as recognized by statute' was not considered
relevant. Mr. Justice Whittaker conceded that Congress had acted
within the scope of its powers, but dissented on other grounds. Perez v.
Brownell, 78 Sup. Ct. 568 (1958).
The principle adopted in the Perez case was first announced in a
1915 denationalization case in MacKenzie v. Hare.' In that case a native
born citizen was held to have lost her citizenship under a 1907 act 5 which
provided that any American woman who marries a foreigner shall take
the nationality of her husband. Mrs. MacKenzie, who was continuously
domiciled in the United States, contended that Congress could not
impose loss of citizenship for marriage to a foreigner. The Supreme Court
held that Mrs. MacKenzie had lost her citizenship through voluntary
expatriation, and announced by way of preliminary explanation that
the United States had the powers of a sovereign nation, including those
which concern its relations with other sovereigns.'
The only other nationalism case in which the doctrine of sovereign
powers has been invoked is Ex parte Griffin, which arose under a different provision of the 1907 act. This section imposed loss of citizenship
for taking an oath of allegiance to another nation. The petitioner took
an oath of allegiance to the King in joining the Canadian army. In upholding denial of re-entry on grounds that petitioner was an alien, the
court declared that though there is no express grant of power to Congress in the Constitution to declare what acts on the part of citizens
235 F.2d 364 (1956).
"54 Stat. 1137 (1940), 8 U.S.C. § 801(e) (1940).
3 Act of July 27, 1868, c. 249, § 1. 15 Stat. 223.
4 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
Act of March 7, 1907, c. 2534, 34 Stat. 1228.
0239 U.S. at 311.
1 237 Fed. 445 (N.D. N.Y. 1916).
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Constitute abandonment and renunciation of citizenship, there is an
implied power arising as a necessary conconitant of sovereignty.' The
Court cited MacKenzie as authority for its declaration. The case of Ex
parte (Ng) Fung Sing' should be mentioned here because in that case
the court asserted that citizenship is a political status and privilege which
Congress may define and limit. Other cases in which this constitutional
issue has been touched upon are not persuasive. "
Prior to Perez, the doctrine of sovereign powers seems to have had
its greatest vitality in other fields. In the case of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp, " where the issue was whether a joint resolution
of Congress met the standard for valid delegation of legislative authority to the executive, Mr. Justice Sutherland declared that the power of
government in respect to foreign affairs is not limited by the Constitution.
He reasoned that this power is vested in the government as a necessary
concomitant of sovereignty."
In only two pre-Perez cases involving loss of citizenship for voting
in a foreign political election has the constitutional issue been seriously
considered. Both cases arose in the federal district court for Hawaii. In
Okiniura v. Acheson,'" the court declared § 401 (e) of the Nationality
Act of 19,10 to be unconstitutional on the ground that Congress (lid not
have the power to take away citizenship. " Secretary of State Acheson appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. That court vacated
the judgment and remanded the case with directions to make findings
as to whether the petitioner's conduct was voluntary." On rehearing, the
district court found the acts to be involuntary, and the petitioner was
declared to be a citizen of the United States.'
In the later case of
Terada v. Dulles, " involving the same section of the act, the same district court held that Congress was without power to provide for autonatic divestiture of citizenship. This ruling was not appealed.
In the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark" the power of Congress to alter the status of citizenship was in question. The Court held
that the Constitution has conferred on Congress no right to alter or restrict the effect of birth in the United States. =" Also, by way of dictum, in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States'* the Court found that the Constitution does not authorize Congress to abridge those rights of citizenship
defined and fixed by the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution.'I Id. at 453.
0 6 F.2d 670 (W.D. Wash. 1925).
1oridales v. Brownell, 217 F 2d 136 (9th Cir. 1954); Gonzales v. Landon, 215 F.2d
955 (9th Cir. 1954): Miranda v. Clark, 180 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1950).
"Fong Yue Ting v. United States. 149 U.S. 698 (1893); United States v. Peace
Information Center 97 F. Supp. 255 (D. D.C. 1951).
- 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
"3 Id. at 318.
14 99 F. Supp. 587 (D. Hawaii 1951).
13Id. at 589.
16 Acheson v. Okimura, 342 U.S. 899 (1952).
17Okimura v. Acheson, 111 F. Supp. 303, (D. Hawaii 1953).
Is 121 F. Supp. 6 (D. Hawaii 1954).
9 169 U.S. 649 (1898).
20 Id.
at 703.
21 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
22 Id. at 827.
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Much stronger language was used in Kansas v. Colorado.'" There the
Court declared, in explicit repudiation of the doctrine of sovereign
powers, that it clearly appears from the Constitution that our governmerit is a government of enumerated powers."'
The irreconcilable conflict of cases in the area of expatriation had
its inception in a series of cases arising in the district court for 1awaii.'5
The existence of the troublesome constitutional question was recognized,
and that court elected to follow the cases which had rejected the doctrine
of sovereign powers. The Perez decision repudiates that view, adopts the
doctrine of sovereign powers, and expressly rejects the proposition that
the fourteenth amendment restricts the operation of the foreign relacited by the Court as authority on this
tions power. Perkins v. Elg,
point, reaches the conclusion that citizenship is deemed to continue
unless specifically revoked by terms of treaty or Congressional enactinent. 7
In view of the conclusions reached in Trop v. Dulles," however,
Perez is inconclusive authority for the proposition that deprivation of citizenship is within the scope of Congressional authority. The Trop case,
decided in the same term but subsequent to Perez, arose under § 401 (g)
of the 1940 Nationality Act. This provision provided for loss of citizenship for desertion from the armed forces during war. Trop was convicted by court martial for desertion during war. Mr. Chief Justice
Warren, speaking for the Court in a five to four decision, reiterated
the position taken by the minority in the Perez decision, to the effect
that Congress was without power to enact statutory provisions for expatriation. An alternative ground, however, was stated in.deference to
the Perez decision. The Court declared that § 401 (g) was not within
the War Power of Congress, and that the effect of the section was to impose cruel and unusual punishment within the Constitutional prohibition.
The crucial question of the scope of Constitutional limitations on
the foreign relations power was decided by the Perez case. The Court
was bold indeed in declaring that this power is not limited by the fourteenth amendment, for Perez viewed with MacKenzie indicates that
there is no distinction between acts performed in the United States and
acts performed abroad. It follows logically that any act that Congress
may wish to specify which might tend to embarrass us in our relations
with other nations or interfere with the effective conduct of foreign
affairs may be deemed an expatriating act, even though the act be performed lawfully and in the exercise of rights protected by the Constitution. The application of the doctrine of sovereign powers to nationalization cases is a dangerous precedent. The alleged necessity of preventing embarrassment in the conduct of foreign affairs could well become the expedient of tyrants.
"3,206 U.S. 46 (1907).
"I Id. at 89.
2 Sakarnoto v. Dutles, 111 F. Supp. 308 (D. Hawaii 1953); Murata v. Acheson, 111
F. Supp. 306. (D Hawaii 1953) Okimura v. Acheson, 99 F. Supp. 5S7 (D. Hawaii 1951);
Ouye v. Acheson, 91 F. Supp. 129 (D. Hawaii 1950).
26 307 U.S. 325 (1939).
"7 Id. at 329.
26 78 Sup. Ct. 590 (1958).
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fncome Taxation-Funded Corporate Buy-Sell AgreementsCorporation's Paynen t of Premium for Life Insurance
On Stockholder (is I)ividenid
ROBETW L. FRYE

Robert L. Frye received his Bachelor of Arts degree in Sociology from
Princeton University, and is currently a student at the University of Denver
College of Law.
The four stockholders of a corporation entered into a stock redemption agreement, under the terms of which the corporation bought insurance on their individual lives to fund the agreement. The corporation
paid the premiums and owned all rights in the policies, except that each
stockholder was allowed to designate the beneficiary of the policies
carried on his life. At the death of a stockholder, the corporation was
to transfer the decedent's insurance to the named beneficiary for collection, and transfer to itself as Much of the stock as could be purchased by
the proceeds at a predetermined price. The beneficiary was to get either
the value of the decedent's stock or the insurance on the decedent's life,
whichever was greater. Stock value was set by vote of the shareholders
periodically, or by arbitration if necessary. Any funds for the agreement
were to come Out of1 surplus, and if the corporation were unable to pay
the premiums out of surll us at any timc, the agreement would end, the
corporation would be named as beneficiary of the policies, and would
hold them as ordinary corporate assets. The corporation did not claim
the premiums as a deduction on its income tax, but accounted for them as
an asset on its balance sheet. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the premiums were not constructive dividends to the individual
stockholders. Sanders v. Fox, 2531 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958).
Similarly, in another recent case, PruMnier v. Commissioner,' insurance was usedl to Ifundt a buy-out agreement between two brothers, the
officers and 97o( stockholders of the corporation. Although the inisurance policies were all applied for by the brothers as individuals, and the
corporation was not named as beneficiary until some time after the Conmissioner had questioned the corporate ownership, the First Circuit
Court of Appeals found that under controlling state law the corporation
was the beneficial owner, and could have obtained the proceeds if the
iIsutrance had matured during the tax year in question. On this ground,
the court held that the premiums paid were not taxable as income to the
stockholders.
On the other hand, in Paramount-Richards Theatres, Inc. v. Cornmissioner," there was an agreement between stockholders providing that
one stockholder would buy the stock of the other at the latter's decease.
This purchase was to be funded in part by insurance on the life of the
248 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 28 T.C. No. 4 (1957).
- 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
I
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stockholder, paid for by the corporation, but owned by the insured.
The court in this case found that both stockholders stood to benefit
equally from the payment of premiums by the corporation, but that the
corporation itself stood to gain nothing, and held that the premium
payments in question constituted dividend income to the insured stockholder, and were taxable to him.:
The Commerce Clearing House tax reporter,' in an editorial comment on the Internal Revenue Service Tax Guide for Small Business,
says that the IRS position on life insurance premiums paid by a corporation when both corporation and stockholders benefit from the payment
is that the amount of premiums may be regarded as constructive dividends, especially when a closely held corporation is involved. But the
Tenth Circuit, in passing on the Sanders case, specifically rejected the
test of "weighing the ultimate purposes to be served and the potential
benefits" ' which might accrue to either the corporation or the individual
stockholders-on the ground that such a test was "impractical." They
held that "the correct rule must limit the analysis to those benefits 'presently realized' . . . . (by the stockholder) ."'
The court in Sanders has unquestionably accepted buy-sell agr-eements as being of benefit to the corporation. In Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner,' an action brought under the Excess Profits Tax Act, the corporation had bought single-premium life insurance on its two principal
stockholder-officers, as key-man insurance, with the corporation named
as beneficiary. When a subsequent trust agreement established a buy-sell
agreement funded by this insurance, the Commissioner sought to tax the
corporation on the premiums paid for the insurance. The court held
that the premiums represented "borrowed invested capital" within the
meaning of the act, and not dividends; and they announced for the first
time that "continuity" and "harmony" of management are legitimate
3 Accord, Yuengling v. Commissioner, 69 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1934); Earl Dl. Jameson,
P-H 1942 B.T.A. Mem. Dec. § 42,042; cf. Casper Ranger Construction Co., I B.T.A.
942 (1925).
4 6 CCH 1958 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. § 8770.
5 253 F.2d at 860.
6 Id. at 858-59.
7 189 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1951).
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objectives of a corporation in disbursing its funds'

-a

view expressly

applied in the Sanders and Prun ier cases.
A recent case pointing up "corporate benefit" is Casale v. Commissioner." The taxpayer was the 980 stockholder of a corporation, and its
president. He entered into a deferred compensation agreement with the
corporation, contingent on his not leaving the corporation or competing
with it "against its wishes." The corporation was authorized at the same
time, but in a separate corporate transaction, to purchase and pay
premiums on an annuity policy. The corporation was the declared
owner of the policy, and the beneficiary, but Casale had the right to
change the beneficiary under the terms of the agreement. Tile policy
was carried as an asset on the corporate bcoks, and the corporation could
assign the policy or borrow against its loan value. The Tax Court found
that the taxpayer had not dealt "at arm's length" with his corporation.
They held, in effect, that the transaction was a "sham." It was stated
t'hat Casale "was the corporation, ....
and that the corporation was merely
a "Conluit'. for passing the benefits to him.
The Second Circuit, in reversing the Tax Court, noted that the corporation was not a "sham," but a legitimate business enterprise. They
held that Casale did not realize any benefit from the policy, fcr various
reasons. The primary reason seemed to be that there was no guarantee
that the funds from the policy would be available to pay the agreed compensation, since the policy was a corporate asset and thus subject to the
fortunes of the business. It could be reached by creditors as could any
other corporate asset. The opinion stressed the point that the corporation might benefit by having the proceeds to discharge the corporate
c.bligation incurred under the deferred ccmpensation agreement, but
that it might also benefit by having the policy available to creditors in
case of corporate insolvency.
This reasoning would also seem appropriate to the buy-out agreenent cases: \,Vhether or not the corporation uses the funds to carry out
the agreements, it will get a corporate benefit from their use, possibly as
collateral for needed Icans, or in case of corporate insolvency, to pay
creditors. Further, this argument underlines the fact that the individual
stockholders may never receive any benefit from tie policies.
The Casale case seems to roughly equate "corporate benefit" with
corporate ownership of the policies, an idea which seems to be implicitly
accepted in both the Sandeis and Priinie decisions. This idea would appear to be justifiable in most cases: If the corporation owns the policies,
they are still subject to the hazards of the business, as was pointed out
above, but if the taxpayer owns them, it would appear that for all practical purposes he has received an economic benefit "unqualifiedly subject to his demand.""' This idea, furthermore, would explain the court's
holding in the Sanders case that the stockholder had received no "benefits 'presently realized'... . ..
Accord,
, 247 F.2d
10 26 T.C.
11 Ibid.
12 Hadley
s

Fred F. Fischer, 6 CCH Tax Ct. Mern. 520 (1947).
440 (2d Cir. 1957), reversing 26 T.C. 1020 (1956).
at 1025.
v. Commissioner, 36 F.2d 543, 544 (D.C. Cir. 1929).
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Several cases have been decided on the question of whether premiums
paid by a corporation may be construed as income to an emlployee. It is
clear that a premium payment which is essentially in the nature of compensation is taxable. The courts have found in any one of several ways
that a premium payment was intended as compensation: if the payment
is charged to expense on the corporate books," ' or if no reservation is
made to the corporation as to ownership of the policy or power to clesignate beneficiaries,' or even where the corporation has the power to
designate the beneficiaries but it has been exercised in favor of the employee's family or estate,' such payment has been held to be colnpensation, and taxable to the individual.
The analogy between these cases and the prol)lem presented in tile
principal case was recognized by the Tenth Circuit when they said,
"These cases demonstrate the alternative rules that if' the corporation
pays preliums on a policy on the life of an employee or stockholder as
its own investment no tax consequences to the insured arise, but ifit
pays the premiums on the policy owned by the insured and of which he
designates the beneficiary the amount paid ill prenliums constitutes taxable income to him.""
Only one case has been found where it was held that the taxpayer
had not received income when le owned the policies completely. In
Lewis v. O'Malley," the president and sole stockholder of the corporation
applied for and was issued two single-premium insurance policies oil his
life, which were paid for by the corporation. He was the true owner,
could and did designate the beneficiary (his estate, his family, and a
charitable religious institution were designated at various times) , and
no reservation of an interest in the policies was made to the corporation
in any form. The Commissioner charged Lewis with having received a
dividend in the amount of the premiullls paid hy the corporation. Tile
Eighth Circuit found in favor of the taxpayer. The court found that the
policies were always treated as a corporate asset. They were carried on
the books as such, loans were made directly to the corporation Oil the
policies, and the policies were eventually surrendered and their surrenlder
value returned to the corporation. But in spite of this decision, it would
seem that unless the stockholders can clearly show that the policies are
in fact corporate assets, they run the risk of being taxed on the premiums
if they own the policies as individuals. One may wonder how tile Lewis
case might have been decided if at the time of decision tile policies were
still in force, anti owned by the taxpayer.
So
ficiaries
buy-sell
holder,

although the stockholders may be allowed to designate
and the life insurance may be made an integral part
agreement without tax consequences to the individual
the safest approach in funding such agreements with life

beneof the
stockiIsur-

1. Commissioner v. Bonwit, 87 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 302 U.S. 694 (1937);
Canaday v. Guitteau, 86 F.2d 303 (6th Cir. 1936). For a similar holding as to annuities,
see United States v. Dreseher, 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950): Renton K. Brodie, I T.C.
275 (1942); cf. Card v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 93 (8th Cir. 19.54).
14 Commissioner v. Bonwit, su)ra note 13: Canaday v. Guitteau, supra note 13.
15 N. Loring Danforth, 18 B.T.A. 1221 (1930).
16253 F.2d at 859-60.
17 140 F.2d 735 (8th Cir. 1944).
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ance would be to make the corporation clearly the owner of the policies,
and make the policies a corporate asset, not reserved to any particular
use. Further, it should be borne in mind that the Commissioner has not,
at this time, acquiesced in these decisions.
The court, in passing on the principal case, remarked that different
problems will arise at the dleath or withdrawal of one of the stockholders.
At that time the question o1 constructive dividends may again be raised.
But if, as seems likely, the decisions in Sanders v. Fox and Prunier v.
Commissioner are followed, premiums pai(d by a corporation on policies
owned by the corporation will not be taxable to the stockholder at the
time of their payment.
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Income Taxation - Ordinary and Necessary Business Expenses Fines for Operating Overloaded Trucks Not Deductible

By

PHILIP C. PRESTON

Philip C. Preston received his B.S. in Business Administration in 1949 and
his Master's degree in Business Administration in 1957, both from the University of Denver. He is a Certified Public Accountant and is presently a
freshman in the University of Denver College of Law.

Plaintiff, a trucking company, deducted under § 23 (a) (1) (A) of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 fines paid for inadvertent violations
of state statutes prescribing maximum truck axle weight limits.' These
violations usually resulted from shifting of loads during transit or from
reliance on the weight stated in bills of lading inaccurately compiled in
small communities having no weighing facilities. The federal court
denied the deduction, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the fines were not
"ordinary and necessary business expenses" since the violations could
have been avoided. Since the state statutes did not make a distinction
between innocent and willful violators, allowance of the deduction for
inadvertent violations would have severely and directly frustrated state
policy. Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 78 Sup. Ct. 511
(1958).
A companion case, decided the same day, concerned another trucking company which attempted to deduct, as ordinary and necessary business expenses, fines paid by the firm and its drivers for violations of
state maximum weight laws. Pennsylvania state weight laws made it impossible for truckers to comply and still operate profitably.' In order to
continue in business, this particular trucker (like many others) had to
overload and run the risk of being fined for violating the law. The
company paid numerous fines and deducted them as ordinary and necessary business expenses. The Commissioner denied the deduction, the
Tax Court upheld his ruling, and the Third Circuit affirmed. On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there
was no merit to petitioner's argument that the fines imposed were not
penalties at all, but merely a revenue toll. The State assessed these fines
as a penal measure, and their allowance as a deduction would frustrate
a sharply defined state policy. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
78 Sup. Ct. 507 (1958).
The argument of the petitioner in the Tank Truck Rentals case
(contending that the fines assessed were actually revenue tolls) is par"See. 23. Deductions from gross income.
"In computing net income there shall be allowed as deductions:
"(a) Expenses.
"(1) Trade or business expenses.
"(A) In general. All the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business ...
."Int. Rev. Code of
1939, § 23 (a) (1) (A), as amended, 56 Stat. 819 [now, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)].
2 The law was later changed, Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 75, § 453 (Purdon Supp. 1957).
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allel to the reasoning of the Internal Revenue Service itself when it
issued a special ruling in September of 1942 that such fines were deductible.' That ruling remained in effect until it was rescinded by a
new ruling of the Commissioner issued November 30, 1950.' Since that
time, the Commissioner and the courts have generally held that these
penalties are punishments inflicted by the state on those who commit
acts violating fixed public policy, and that to permit a violator to gain
a tax advantage through deducting the amount of the penalty as a
business expense and thus mitigate the degree of punishment, would
frustrate the purpose and effectiveness of that public policy.' The application of the public policy standard has been tempered in cases involving innocent violation of statutes where the statute itself makes a
definite distinction between innocent and willful violations.'
The concept that the deductibility of business expenses is subject
to an overriding limitation of so-called u)Llblic policy was also recently
considered by the Supreme Court in the Sullivan case with regard to
rent and wages paid by bookies. 7 A bookmaker hired employees to help
in his gambling operations and rented premises in which he carried on
his bookmaking. The taxpayers, whose activities were alleged to be illegal tinder Illinois law,' sought to deduct these as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. The Supreme Court held both items to be deductible
business expenses which should not be disallowed on the basis of pLl)lic
policy. The Court first pointed out that the Treasury Department itself
recognizes gambling as a business. For example, the regulations make
the federal excise tax on wages a deductible item. They then point out
that the ordinary and necessary expenses of a business, like rent and
wages, should be deductible, otherwise the income tax would be levied
on gross rather than net income.
The question presents itself: why, then, when violation of a statute
has traditionally been a major ground for testing conflict with public
policy," was not the violation of the statute in the Sullivan case determinative, as it was in both the Hoover Motor Express and Tank Truck
Rentals cases? The crux of the court's reasoning in these two apparently
conflicting decisions seems to be the illegality of the act creating the
expense (violation o1 trucking statutes) as contrasted to expenses ordinarily legal (payment of rent) incurred in connection with an illegal
activity. Congress has consistently rejected provisions which would deny
deductions for illegal activities. The object of the Revenue Act of 1913,
the language of which in regard to this section has been carried forward,
was not "to reform men's characters.'"' In 1951, Senator Kefauver sought
unsuccessfully to amend § 162 by prohibiting deductions "for any ex3 Commissioner
letter issued on September 10, 1942, published in P-H 1950 Fed.
Tax Service § 76.321.
I.T. 4042. 1951-1 Cum. Bull. 112.
Commissioner V. Longhorn Portland Cement Co.. 148 F. 2d 276 (5th Cir. 1945).
6 Commissioner v. Pacific Ml:lls, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953); National Brass Works
v. Comm ssioner, 182 F.2d 526 (9th Cir. 1950): J. Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175
F.2d 7t1 (2d Cir. 1949).
Commissioner v. N. Sullivan. 78 Sup. Ct. 512 (1958).
8 I1. Rev. Stat.. 1945, C 38. § 336.
SU.S. Treas. Reg. 118. § 39.23(a)-I (1953); Rev. Rul. 54-219, 1954-1 Cum. Bull. 51.
106 Corbin, Coitracts §§ 1373-74 (1150).
1150 Cong. Rec. 3850 (1913).
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pense paid or incurred in or as a result of illegal wagering."'- Prior to
the recodification of the Code in 1954, the American Law Institute
unsuccessfully recommended that Congress change the statute to disallow deductibility of illegal expenses."'
The public policy concept has been extended to illegitimate expenses of an illegitimate business,' but the most recent Tax Court decision allowed a deduction for expenses which appear to be of an illegitimate nature (costs of printing lottery tickets) pointing to the Sullivan
case as authority."
As the Court pointed out in the Sullivan case, deduction does not
turn on general equitable considerations but depends on legislative
grace." Although the decisions in the trucking cases may appear to be
somewhat harsh when contrasted with the Sullivan case, none of the
cases departed from the trend that the courts have taken with regard to
the two situations presented. Congress is apparently averse to utilizing
the tax code to help stamp out organized crime, so the courts have shied
away from use of the public policy concept in this area. Since the sometimes necessary violations of legitimate businesses have not been subject
to such "legislative grace," the Commissioner and the courts have made
full use of the concept in cases involving these violations.
97 Cong. Rec. 12230-31, 12244 (1951).
a A.L.I. Fed. Income Tax Stat. § X 165 (i) (1) (Feb. 1954 Draft).
"Comeaux v. Commissioner, 176 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1949).
15 L. Cohen, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 284 (April 8, 1958).
6 Deputy v.
Du Pont, 308 U.S. 4S8 (1940).
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OPINION NO. 1
May 28, 1958
1. Service on the Board of Trustees of a corporation engaged in a private
business venture by a Judge of a court of record violates the Canons
of Judicial Ethics of the American and Colorado Bar Associations
Nos. 24land 25.
2. A Judge should not be identified with a private business venture
under circumstances that will give reasonable ground for the suspicion that the power or prestige of his office is being utilized to
persuade or coerce others to patronize such private business venture.
The following statement and inquiry were presented by a member
of the Association:
FACTS

A corporation is organized under the laws of a state as a non-profit
organization. The certificate of incorporation states the purposes of the
corporation to be:
"The particular business and objects for which our said
Corporation is formed and incorporated shall be: to establish,
maintain, and operate a Non-Profit Medical Service Plan whereby medical and surgical care may be obtained at the expense
of the Corporation by residents of the State of.
who are subscribers to the Plan under a contract entitling the
subscriber to such medical and surgical care as may be provided
thereby and as may be procured from doctors of medicine duly
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licensed to practice by the State of -----------------and registered with the Corporation to render such services; to arrange
with such doctors of medicine for the rendering of such service
to the subscribers to the Plan; to promote the general and social
welfare of subscribers to the Plan; and to do all things necessary,
proper or convenient for the purpose of promoting, establishing,
and operating said Non-Profit Medical Service Plan."
The corporation is now engaged in operating such non-profit medical service plan. It has a board of trustees, consisting of 19 trustees.
Neither the officers nor trustees of the corporation receive any compensation for their services.
Two members of the board of trustees of the corporation are judges
of courts of record.
Subscribers to the plan make payments to the plan on the basis of
rate schedules.
The corporation, on its letterhead, sets forth the names of the trustees. Preceding the names of the two judges who serve as trustees is the
word "Judge."
The corporation publishes an annual report which contains reprocluctions of photographs of the members of the board of trustees. The
name of the trustee appears under his photograph. Preceding the names
of the two judges is the word "Judge."
QUESTIONS

An inquirer desires the opinion of the committee as to whether,
under the facts stated: (1) Service on the board of trustees by a judge
of a court of record violates the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the American and Colorado Bar Associations; (2) The use of the names of the
judges on the letterhead of the corporation and the use of the reproduced photographs and names of the judges in the annual report constitutes a violation of Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics of the
American Bar Association.
The committee's opinion was stated by Mr. Younge, Messrs. Chutkow, Phillips, Platt, Romer and Sears concurring.
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In this, an early opinion of the committee, we deem it desirable to
define the functions of this committee.
First, it is not a function of this committee to investigate charges
of a violation by a lawyer or a judge of the Canons of Professional Ethics
or t'le Canons of Judicial Ethics of the Colorado Bar Association and/cr
the American Bar Association, or to undertake to ascertain and state
the facts with respect to such alleged violation or to determine whether
the lawyer or the judge has been guilty of a violation of the Canons of
Professional Ethics or the Canons of Judicial Ethics.
Rather, it is the function of this committee to answer inquiries on
the basis of an impersonal and hypothetical statement of facts and the
assumiptions contained therein presented by the inquirer as to whether
the conduct set forth in such statement of facts would or would not
constitute a violation of the Canons of Professional Ethics or the Canons
of Judicial Ethics of the Colorado Bar Association and/or the American
Bar Association.
I. Judicial Canon 24 states:
"A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; * * * which
will in any way interfere or appear to interfere with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official
functions."
The facts as stated concerning the particular corporation and the
participation of judges therein discloses that this is a corporation which
may be competitive to other corporations both of a profit and nonprofit nature. The corporation may become involved in litigation which
Could come before the judges serving as directors or trustees.
.judicial Canon 25 specifically provides:
"A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable
suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office
to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either
to the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such
suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the influence of his
nane to promote the business interests of others; he should not
solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in the normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the
impartial performance of his official duties."
'[he facts stated warrant a reasonable suspicion that the power and
prestige of the office of the judges is being utilized by the corporation
engaged in a private business venture to persuade others to patronize its
services. A judge should avoid that possible suspicion.
2. The use of the names of the judges on the letterhead of the corporation and the use of the reproduced photographs and names of the
judges in the annual report merely emphasize and make more obvious
the fact that there is a violation of Canon 25 of the Canons of Judicial
Ethics.
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OPINION No. 2
Filed .june 24, 1958
1. A judge should not pursue a course of conduct with respect to a
private business venture that would give ground for any reasonable
inference that his name or the prestige of his office is being used to
exert pressure on others to patronize such private business.
2. A judge should not be a member of a partnership engaged in a
private business venture. He should not serve as an officer, director,
or trustee of a corporation engaged in private business.
3l. A judge may ordinarily serve on the governing body of an educational institution, a hospital, a charitable organization, a bar association, a social club, a boy's work club, and other like organizations.
1. A judge should not solicit contributions to charitable organizations
or permit his name or the prestige of his office to be used to exert
pressure on others to make contributions to charity.
5.

A judge may make investments in stocks and bonds of private
corporations as well as government and municipal securities. However, he should avoid investment in securities of corporations which
are apt to be frequently involved in litigation before his court.

6.

It is unprofessional for a lawyer to solicit professional employment
by circulars, advertisements, or touters, or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations.

7. It is unprofessional for a lawyer to inspire,
publications which state that he is a lawyer
statements with respect to his professional
serves, or the importance or magnitude of his

procure, or consent to
and contain laudatory
ability, the clients he
practice.

8. A lawyer may engage in private business, either individually or as
a partner and may serve as an officer or director of a corporation
engaged in private business, but be should see to it that any publication matter with respect to such business or corporation in which his
name appears should not contain any laudatory statements with
respect to his professional ability, the clients he serves, or the importance or magnitude of his practice.

Photo Copies
Blue Prints
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Pick Up and Delivery
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9. A lawyer should not permit his name to appear on the letterhead of
a corporation, of which he is general counsel, setting forth that fact
where he is also engaged in general practice.
10.

A lawyer may, with propriety, engage in public affairs, in community projects and activities. Canon 25 does not proscribe a lawyer
from being a good citizen. When a lawyer has the opportunity to
perform a service to the community which will place him in the
public eye, he need not hesitate to seek or accept it, because, if successful, he will appear frequently in the newspapers.

The Executive Committee (the President) of the Colorado Bar
Association has submitted the following questions to the committee and
reqtiesteLd its opinion thereon:
1. To what extent may a judge with propriety engage in or be identified with a private business venture?
2. To what extent may a judge with propriety serve on a governing
board of an educational institution, a hospital, a charitable organization, or other like organizations?
3.

Should a judge solicit contributions to charitable organizations or
permit his name or the prestige of his office to be used to persuade
or coerce others to contribute to charitable organizations?

4. \Wfhat are the limitations on personal investments by a judge?
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5. What constitutes direct or indirect advertising by a lawyer within
the meaning of Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics?
The opinion of the committee was stated by Mr. Phillips, Messrs.
Carrigan, Chutkow, Platt, Romer, Sears, Walrod, and Younge concirring, except that Mr. Platt dissents from Syllabus No. 9 and Opinion
285 of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the
American Bar Association.
Judicial Canon 25 of the American and Colorado Bar Associations
reads:
''A judge should avoid giving ground for any reasonable
suspicion that he is utilizing the power or prestige of his office
to persuade or coerce others to patronize or contribute, either to
the success of private business ventures, or to charitable enterprises. He should, therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of conduct, as would justify such
suspicion, nor use the power of his office or the influence of his
name to promote the business interests of others; he should not
solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in the normal course of events reasonably to be
expected, might bring his personal interest into conflict with the
impartial performance of his official duties."
,Judicial Canon 26 of the American and Colorado Bar Associations
in part, reads:
"A judge should abstain from making personal investments
in enterprises which are apt to be involved in litigation in the
court; and, after his accession to the Bench, he should not retain
such investments previously made, longer than a period sufficient to enable him to dispose of them without serious loss. It is
desirable that he should, so far as reasonably possible, refrain
from all relations which would normally tend to arouse the suspicion that such relations warp or bias h is judgment, or prevent
his impartial attitude of mind in the administration of his judicial duties."
Judicial Canon 27 of the American and Colorado Bar Associations
reads:

CLOTHING
Men's Hats & Furnishings
Men's Shop

Seven fifteen Seventeenth Street

KE. 4-0334
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"While a judge is not disqualified from holding executorships or trusteeships, he should not accept or continue to hold
any fiduciary or other position if the holding of it would interfere or seem to interfere with the proper performance of his
judicial duties, or if the business interests of those represented
require investments in enterprises that are apt to come before
him judicially, or to be involved in questions of law to be determined by him."
The first obligation of a judge is to discharge faithfully, impartially,
and expeditiously to the best of his ability the duties of his office. A
judge should not enter into private business ventures. He should not
pursue a course of conduct with respect to a private business venture or
enterprise that would give ground for any reasonable inference that his
name or the prestige of his office is being used to exert pressure on others
to patronize such private business venture or enterprise.
We are of the opinion that a judge should not be a member of a
partnership engaged in a private business venture or enterprise and that
he should not serve as an officer or director or trustee of a corporation
engaged in private business. Should he do so, under normal practices
the fact that he is a judge and an officer or director of the corporation
so engaged will appear in monthly, quarterly, and annual reports and
in other factual matters usually given publicity by such corporation and
in which he will be normally designated as "Judge ................................-"
Such a course of conduct by the judge would give ground for a reasonable inference that the power or prestige of his office or his name was
being used to promote the private business interests of the corporation.
A judge should avoid any conduct which would reasonably give rise to
such an inference.
Moreover, a judge should not serve as an officer or member of the
governing body of a corporation engaged in private business where in
the normal course of events such corporation is apt to become involved
in a case or controversy which will come before the judge for decision
and the relation of the judge to the corporation would disqualify him
front sitting in such case or controversy. Of course, it will not be possible
for a judge to avoid every possible disqualification, but he should make
a reasonable effort so to do.
However, we think the phrase "private business venture" as used in
the Canon has particular significance. In a broad sense an educational
institution, a hospital, and even a charitable organization, to some extent
are engaged in business. The educational institution and the non-profit
hospital charge for part of the services they render. The charitable
institution invests its funds and buys and sells securities in the course of
such investment. But, such institutions and organizations are primarily
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engaged in rendering a service to large segments of the public for which
they receive either no compensation or less compensation than the cost
of rendering the service. Subject to the limitation hereinafter indicated
we do not think that service by a judge on a board of trustees of an
educational institution, a hospital, or a charitable organization, falls
within the ban of Judicial Canon 25. Neither do we think service by a
judge on a board of governors of a bar association, or the governing
body of a social club, a boy's work club, and other like organizations,
the primary function of which is to serve the public or a segment thereof,
and not to make a profit, falls within the ban of judicial Canon 25.
While a judge may serve on a board of an institution, organization,
or association like those referred to in the last preceding paragraph, if
such service would so encroach upon his time as to prevent the prompt
and efficient discharge of his judicial duties, which, of course, may be
true of a judge in an unusually busy court, he should forego such outside activity.
Moreover, a judge should not directly engage in solicitations for
charity and he should not permit his name to be used in connection with
such solicitation in a manner that may reasonably give rise to the inference that his name or the prestige of his office is being used to exert
pressure on others to make contributions for charity.
A precise line of demarcation cannot be drawn whereby it may be
determined what activity or course of conduct falls within or does not
fall within the ban of judicial Canon 25. But, in the light of the language of the Canon and the views above expressed, we think a judge's
sense of propriety will enable him to avoid activities or a course of conduct interdicted by such Canon.
What limitations are imposed on personal investments by a judge
presents a difficult question. We think it generally conceded that prudent investment of funds today requires diversification and should include both stocks and bonds of private corporations. Investments limited
to United States bonds and bonds of states and municipalities do not
provide an adequate diversification. Accordingly, we are of the opinion
that a judge may retain investments and make investments in stocks and
bonds of private corporations. However, he should do so with discrimination. Many corporations will infrequently, if ever, become involved in
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litigation before the court of which he is a judge. Others, as for example
corporations engaged in hazardous enterprises which frequently are
subject to actions for damages by their employees, are apt to be frequently involved in litigation before the court. Investment in securities
of the latter should be avoided.
Canon 27 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American and
Colorado Bar Associations, in part, reads:
"It is unprofessional to solicit professional employment by
circulars, advertisements, through touters or by personal communications or interviews not warranted by personal relations.
Indirect advertisements for professional employment such as
furnishing or inspiring newspaper cormen ts, or procuring his
photograph to be published in connection with causes in which
the lawyer has been or is engaged or concerning the manner of
their conduct, the magnitude of the interest involved, the importance of the lawyer's position, and all other like self-laudatLion, offend the traditions and lower the tone of our profession
and are reprehensible; but the customary use of simple professional cards is not improper."
The first sentence of the first paragraph of the Canon we think fully
answers the inquiry so far as direct solictation of professional employment is concerned.
A more difficult problem arises when we undertake to determine
what indirect advertising for professional employment is inhibited by
the Canon. The Canon condemns indirect advertisements for professional employment. It gives an example of what would constitute such
indirect advertisement in the second sentence of the first paragraph of
the Canon, but we do not think the examples given cover every form of
indirect advertisement for professional employment forbidden by the
Canon. In our opinion, the Canon prohibits the lawyer from inspiring,
procuring, or consenting to publications which state that he is a lawyer
and contain latudatory statements with respect to his professional ability,
the clients he serves, or the importance or magnitude of his practice.
A lawyer may with propriety engage in private business, either individually or as a partner, and may serve as an ollicer or a director of a corporation engaged in private business. But, he should see to it that any
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publication of matters with respect to such business or corporation in
which his name appears should not contain any laudatory statements
with respect to his professional ability, the clients he serves, or the importance or magnitude of his practice.
The publicizing of the fact that a lawyer is general counsel for a
corporation or association and the limitations with respect thereto are
answered in Opinion No. 285 of the Opinions of the Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar Association, wherein
it is stated:
"The Canon does not require a lawyer to condemn or prevent every allusion to him by satisfied clients where the purpose
of the statement is not to advertise the lawyer but is obviously
and primarily in the interest of the party making it, or of those
to whom it is directed, even though some incidental advantage
to the lawyer may possibly result. For example, this Committee
held, in Opinion 100, that it was not improper for a bondholders' protective committee to specify the name of' its counsel in its
published notice directed to bondholders, where such information was inserted not with the object of advertising such counsel,
but with the bona fide purpose of giving to the depositing bondholders the names of the counsel who would represent them.
This, like the personality of the members of the committee, was a
fact which it was evidently important that they should know in
making up their minds whether or not to deposit their bonds.
Laws regulating the issue of corporate securities normally require the submission of an opinion of counsel who pass on their
legality, and permit reference to such counsel by name in prospectuses.
"In other cases it may doubtiess be considered as normal
for a corporation or association to specify the name of its counsel, in order that the members or stockholders may be satisfied
as to the competency of its legal department to advise it on corporate or association legal problems. Thus it would seem proper
for a corporation in its annual report to stockholders to specify,
along with the names of general officers of the corporation,
those of its general counsel. On the other hand it would not
appear to be proper for the corporation or association to specify
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such counsel's name on its letterhead, which would he directed,
not to its stockholders, but to the general public. A lawyer engaged in general practice would, therefore, not normally be
justified in acquiescing in the inclusion of his name as general
counsel on the letterhead of a corporation or manufacturing
association. In exceptional cases, where it is really important
for the addressee to know who are counsel for the association,
they can be advised thereof in the body of the letter. Of course,
in case of counsel employed only by the corporation or association, no question of advertising would be presented.
"The case of the bulletins, issued periodically by a manufacturers' association is more difficult. It is doubtless in the
proper interest of such an association to have its present and
prospective members know who are its general counsel, in order
to be assured protection against legal difficulties in which, by
incompetent advice, the association, and perhaps they as members, might become involved. The names of counsel might,
therefore, properly be specified along with those of the officers,
committees, etc. in the annual report to the members, which
does not, like the bulletins, contain dliscussions of legal problems
on which it is important that the association shall not give the
impression that it is advising the members for their individual
guidance. See Opinion 273.
"Each case must turn on its own facts. In cases where there
is any doubt, the question should be resolved against the propriety of such specification.
"W'e realize that it is quite common practice for manufacturers' associations so to specify the names of their general
counsel, who are usually leading firms of the highest standing.
We have no thought that any of them had any doubt of the
propriety of permitting their names to be mentioned in this or
any similar current case. The very fact, however, that a relaxation of the general rule in this case would affect only leading
law firms is, we believe, a reason for caution in approving exceptions. The American Bar Association, and this Committee,
are steadfast in the determination not to permit the leterior
ation of professional standards under the impact of current
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business competition. To maintain the cooperation of the membership at large in this objective, the leaders in the profession
must always set the example."
It is common practice in the publication of corporate reports and
other like matters for the corporation to set forth the names of its officers
and directors and, with respect to directors, to indicate the business in
which the director is engaged. We think there is no impropriety in
including the name of a lawyer in such matter with the statement that
he is a lawyer or a member of a firm of lawyers, but beyond that it
should not go. In connection with Question No. 5, see Opinions of the
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association Nos. 8, 31, 35, 41, 42, 43, 140, 174, 184, and 284.
What we have said does not mean that a lawyer may not with propriety participate in public affairs or in community projects and activities. The prohibitions of the Canon do not ban the lawyer from being
a good citizen.
In his work on Legal Ethics, Henry S. Drinker, Chairman of the
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances of the American Bar
Association, at page 218, said:
"One of the most frequent objections to Canon 27 is that it
interferes only with the little fellows, precluding them from
making themselves known to prospective clients by advertising
and solicitation, while the big ones not only are constantly in the
public eye, but by means of their membership in clubs and their
prominent participation in Community Chests and in the managenent of hospitals, colleges, etc., are enabled to meet and become intimate with the leaders in business as potential clients.
"These criticisms ignore the distinction between giving
the public the chance to see and judge of the lawyer's ability
and personality, and the direct emphasis of his superiority as a
lawyer.
"Vhen a lawyer has the opportunity to perform a service
to the community which will place him in the public eye, he
need not hesitate to seek or accept it because if successful he will
appear frequently in the newspapers, and will enlarge his circle
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of friends and acquaintances and thus attract new clients, some
possibly who have theretofore employed another lawyer. Where
publicity is the normal by-product of able and effective service,
whether of a professional or non-professional character, this is
a kind of 'advertisement' which is entirely right and proper.
Clients naturally gravitate to a lawyer who has successfully represented their friends or who has obtained the confidence of
the community by effective public service. What is wrong is for
the lawyer to augment by artificial stimulus the publicity normally resulting from what he does, seeing to it that his successes
are broadcast and magnified. While in hypothetical cases it may
often seem difficult to draw the line between what-is right and
what is not, actually, a lawyer soundly brought up in the law,
who wholeheartedly accepts his professional status, will rarely
have any difficulty in realizing the difference between the
normal by-product of efficient service and the unwholesome
results of self-aggrandizement."
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